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Abstract
Randomized experiments are the gold standard for inferring causal e↵ects of treat-
ments. However, complications often arise in randomized experiments when trying to
incorporate additional information that is observed after the treatment has been ran-
domly assigned. The principal stratiﬁcation framework has provided clarity to these
problems by explicitly considering the potential outcomes of all information that is
observed after treatment is randomly assigned. Principal stratiﬁcation is a powerful
general framework, but it is best understood in the context of speciﬁc applied prob-
lems (e.g., non-compliance in experiments and “censoring due to death” in clinical
trials). This thesis considers three examples of the principal stratiﬁcation framework,
each focusing on di↵erent aspects of statistics and causal inference.
In particular, the ﬁrst example considers early escape designs in which additional
rescue medication is provided for patients that do not respond well to the assigned
treatment in a placebo-controlled clinical trial. We demonstrate complications that
arise in such trials as well as provide a Bayesian analysis of a dataset with such com-
plications. Another example considers the case of binary outcomes in a randomized
experiment. Binary outcomes, in combination with a binary treatment, necessarily
lead to four principal strata that cannot be identiﬁed with the observed data. We con-
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sider inference for the average causal e↵ect by testing null hypotheses that determine
the number of units in the principal strata of interest. Fisher’s randomization test,
as t a n d a r dr a n d o m i z a t i o n - b a s e da n a l y s i s ,b r e a k sd o w nf o rs u c hh y p o t h e s e sb e c a u s e
they are not sharp and rely on nuisance unknowns. We interpret the randomization
test as a Bayesian posterior predictive check, which can integrate out the nuisance
unknowns. The last example focuses on estimands that assess the e cacy of a pro-
phylactic treatment of HIV, which ﬁts into the more general framework of assessing
causal e↵ects of treatment for preventing infectious diseases. We focus on two issues
involving information observed after treatment is assigned: exposure to the disease
and interference between units. We link these two issues by showing how interference
occurs because an e↵ective treatment reduces the exposure in the population.
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A principal stratiﬁcation approach
to receipt of rescue medication
1.1 Introduction
The ethics of placebo-controlled clinical trials versus active comparator studies
is a long debated and controversial subject (Lasagna, 1979; Hill, 1994; Temple and
Ellenberg, 2000). Early escape designs for placebo-controlled trials attempt to reduce
the amount of time a subject takes the placebo in order to limit the inherent risk
to less healthy patients of taking an inactive treatment (Temple, 1994). The design
has a clearly deﬁned protocol that allows subjects to receive an additional (non-trial)
treatment, known as rescue medication, if they deteriorate with their assigned treat-
ment. Aspects of early escape designs are commonly employed in drug development
trials. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) recognizes early escape designs,
but warns that such designs may only provide information on short-term e↵ective-
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ness (FDA, 2001, Section 2.1.5.2.2). As Temple (1994) noted, early escape designs
are “truly randomized for a particular drug-placebo comparison only [up to the ﬁrst
time rescue medication is available], after which analysis is complicated by outcome-
dependent changes in therapy”.
To get a sense of these complications, consider the standard intention-to-treat
(ITT) approach that compares subjects assigned to active treatment to subjects as-
signed to placebo. In an early escape design, being “rescued” is an outcome (i.e., ob-
served after randomization) that changes the treatment actually received. For other
clinical outcomes measured post-rescue, comparing the groups according to treatment
assignment no longer has the clear interpretation of comparing receipt of the active
treatment versus receipt of the placebo: the treatment received does not necessarily
correspond to the treatment assigned. That is, the group assigned to active treat-
ment is now composed of subjects receiving only the active treatment but also some
subjects receiving both the active treatment and rescue medication. Analogously, the
group assigned to placebo is now composed of some subjects receiving only placebo
and some subjects receiving both placebo and rescue medication. Therefore, in an
early escape design, the ITT approach is not the desired comparison between those
taking the active treatment and those taking the placebo, but instead a comparison
of assignment to the active treatment versus assignment to the placebo.
Early escape designs are intended to solve real ethical dilemmas (Temple, 1994;
White et al., 2001). In order to address the complications that arise from early es-
cape designs, we employ the principal stratiﬁcation framework (Frangakis and Rubin,
2002), which deﬁnes latent groups based on post-treatment outcomes, here, whether
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or not a subject receives rescue medication under both treatments. With principal
stratiﬁcation, we can deﬁne a set of subjects for which the comparison of active treat-
ment and placebo is justiﬁed, regardless of when the outcome is measured. This
approach also separates the estimand (that is, the quantity of scientiﬁc interest) from
the estimation process. As we will show, an analysis that uses principal stratiﬁcation
di↵ers from an analysis that only considers the subjects that are observed to be not
rescued. Analyses based only on the observed outcomes can lead to estimands that
do not have a causal interpretation.
In Section 1.2 we introduce data from a clinical trial of relapsing-remitting mul-
tiple sclerosis, which we use as a motivating example throughout. We introduce the
principal stratiﬁcation framework in Section 1.3. Comparisons to other methods are
discussed in Section 1.4. In Section 1.5 we provide a formal analysis of our example via
Bayesian multiple imputation. Section 1.6 concludes our discussion with extensions
and relates this work to previous studies of principal stratiﬁcation.
1.2 Example
Multiple sclerosis (MS) is a chronic, progressive, autoimmune disease of the cen-
tral nervous system that a↵ects a range of neurologic functions including motor,
sensory, and cognitive functions. Relapsing-remitting MS is one of four subtypes and
is characterized by episodes of worsening symptoms—relapses—followed by periods
of inactivity—remissions. To illustrate the complications of an early escape design,
we consider a placebo-controlled clinical trial of treatment for relapsing-remitting MS.
The ethical dilemma is clear: it is not in the patient’s best interest to have a
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chronic disease, like relapsing-remitting MS, progress while taking a placebo. Lublin
and Reingold (2001), Polman et al. (2008), and Tenser (2009) discuss the ethics
of using placebo-controlled or active-control trials for treatments of MS. Regardless
of ethical debates, regulatory agencies (e.g., FDA) determine the requirements for
clinical trials to gain approval for a new treatment. In many instances, as in the case
study we present here, the guidelines expect the incorporation of a placebo arm in
the trial. Early escape designs o↵er a compromise by allowing all patients to receive
additional rescue medication if necessary.
The study was a double-blinded, multi-center, placebo-controlled randomized
trial. The trial enrolled N = 848 subjects, with a 2 : 1 allocation of active treat-
ment to placebo. Subjects were block randomized within 99 sites and observed over
two years. Several pre-treatment covariates related to disease severity were measured
before treatment assignment. The covariates include the number of relapses within
one year prior to treatment (0   1v s .> 1), presence of Gadolinium (Gd) enhanced
lesions detected through MRI (absent vs. present), number of T2 lesions detected
through MRI (< 9v s .  9), baseline Expanded Disability Status Scale (EDSS) score
( 3.5v s .> 3.5), and age (< 40 vs.   40). Summaries of the covariates by treatment
groups are provided in Table 1.1, which shows the covariates are well balanced. The
primary clinical outcome of interest is the number of relapses within the ﬁrst year of
the study. Ideally, the treatment would reduce the the number of relapses.
Although ideally all patients would complete the study, as in most trials some
patients discontinued for a variety of reasons. As such, the length of time a subject
was in the study varied. For the purposes of this paper, we chose to analyze the data
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at year one for several reasons. First, there was complete follow-up for all subjects up
until year one. Also, estimands deﬁned for subjects that are observed over di↵ering
lengths of time are less interpretable. Additionally, considering outcomes at one point
in time provides a simpler demonstration of the principal stratiﬁcation framework
than considering multiple times. A more complete analysis would handle missing
data due to dropouts in a more principled manner (e.g., see Barnard et al., 2003) and
consider outcomes at multiple points in time.
This trial followed an early escape design that allowed subjects who did not re-
spond to their initially assigned treatment to receive supplemental rescue medication.
Subjects with some degree of progression of disability measured by EDSS were given
the option to go on a pre-approved treatment in addition to the assigned study drug
(either placebo or active treatment). Subjects who took the rescue medication are
called “rescued”. The indicator for whether or not a subject receives rescue medica-
tion within one year of ﬁrst treatment is a well deﬁned outcome.
To illustrate di culties introduced by allowing rescue medication, consider both
the primary outcome and the rescue outcome, which are summarized by treatment
assignment in Table 1.1. The assignment to treatment has a signiﬁcant reduction of
0.39 relapses on average. Assignment to treatment also signiﬁcantly reduces the need
for rescue medication by 3%. The causal e↵ect on the receipt of rescue medication
can be attributed to receipt of the active treatment versus placebo. However, because
3% of subjects assigned to active treatment and 6% of subjects assigned to placebo
took additional rescue medication, the reduction of 0.39 relapses is not a comparison
of receiving only active treatment versus receiving only placebo. The principal strat-
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iﬁcation framework clearly deﬁnes a group of subjects for which such interpretation
is correct.
Table 1.1: Averages of covariates and outcomes by treatment and placebo. All p-
values come from Fisher exact tests except for relapses, which uses Welch’s t test.
Covariate Treatment Placebo Di↵erence P-value
Prior relapses 0.410 0.408 0.001 1.000
Gd lesions 0.498 0.447 0.051 0.167
T2 lesions 0.954 0.961 -0.007 0.723
EDSS 0.122 0.116 0.006 0.824
Age 0.365 0.401 -0.036 0.329
Outcome
Rescued 0.028 0.060 -0.031 0.037
Relapses 0.245 0.637 -0.393 <0.001
1.3 Rescue medication deﬁnes principal strata
1.3.1 Potential outcomes
We work under the Rubin Causal Model (RCM; Holland, 1986), which extends
Neyman’s approach beyond randomized experiments and randomization-based infer-
ence (Neyman et al., 1990). For subject i =1 ,...,N,l e tYi(0) and Yi(1) denote
the potential outcomes of the clinical endpoint of interest under the placebo and
active treatment, respectively. In early escape designs, whether or not a subject re-
quires rescue medication is another well-deﬁned outcome. Let Di(0) and Di(1) be
the indicators of whether or not subject i received rescue medication (D for “drug”)
under the placebo and active treatment, respectively. In the MS trial, Yi(z)i st h e
number of relapses within one year of starting the trial, and Di(z)i s1i fs u b j e c ti
receives rescue medication within one year of starting the trial and 0 otherwise, for
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z 2{ 0,1}.Ac a u s a le ↵ e c ti sac o m p a r i s o no ft h ep o t e n t i a lo u t c o m eu n d e ra s s i g n m e n t
to the active treatment versus the potential outcome under assignment to placebo for
aw e l l - d e ﬁ n e dg r o u po fs u b j e c t s .
Writing the potential outcomes as functions of the indicator of assignment to
treatment requires the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA Rubin, 1980),
which states there is no interference between subjects and no hidden versions of the
treatments. In the example of the MS trial, we assume that the treatment assignment
of one subject does not a↵ect the outcome of another subject. Moreover, for each
subject, there is only one version of the active treatment and the placebo.
The principal stratiﬁcation framework deﬁnes “principal strata” based on post-
treatment variables such as the indicator of rescue medication. The key idea is to
consider the potential outcomes of the indicator of rescue medication under the two
treatments jointly, but both of which are never fully observed. We encode the pair
Di(1) and Di(0) more concisely as Si:
• Si = NN if Di(1) = Di(0) = 0, subject i is never1rescued;
• Si =R Ni fDi(1) = 1 and Di(0) = 0, subject i is only rescued under active
treatment;
• Si = NR if Di(1) = 0 and Di(0) = 1, subject i is only rescued under placebo;
• Si =R Ri fDi(1) = Di(0) = 1, subject i is always rescued.
We label these four principal strata the never rescued, rescued under active treatment,
1“Never” means regardless of treatment assignment.
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rescued under placebo, and always rescued, respectively. The N notation evokes “not
rescued” and R notation evokes “rescued”.
With these four principal strata, the comparison of receipt of only active treatment
versus receipt of only placebo is well deﬁned solely for the NN principal stratum, which
is composed of subjects who only take placebo when assigned the placebo and only
take active treatment when assigned the active treatment. The average causal e↵ect
for the NN principal stratum is
⌧NN = Y NN(1)   Y NN(0),
where for z 2{ 0,1}
Y NN(z)=
1
N⇡NN
X
i:Si=NN
Yi(z)a n d⇡NN =
1
N
X
i:Si=NN
1.
In the example of the MS clinical trial, ⌧NN compares the average number of re-
lapses within one year under the active treatment (alone) and placebo (alone) for
the subpopulation of subjects who would not require rescue medication under the
active treatment or placebo. The never rescued principal stratum is not the same as
the subset of units who are observed to be not rescued (Section 1.4.2 discusses this
distinction in detail).
Analogous deﬁnitions of these ﬁnite population quantities apply to the other three
principal strata as well. Generally, for s 2{ NN,RN,NR,RR},l e t⌧s be the average
causal e↵ect for principal stratum s,l e tY s(z)b et h ea v e r a g eo ft h ep o t e n t i a lo u t c o m e s
for treatment z 2{ 0,1} in principal stratum s,a n dl e t⇡s be the proportion of
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subjects in principal stratum s. For subjects not in the NN stratum, the causal e↵ect
is a comparison of assignment to active treatment versus assignment to placebo;
the interpretation is not a comparison of receiving just the active treatment versus
receiving just the placebo.
The principal stratum level e↵ects can be contrasted to the traditional ﬁnite pop-
ulation average causal e↵ect, which is deﬁned for the entire sample. The average
causal e↵ect is
⌧ = Y (1)   Y (0), (1.1)
where Y (z)= 1
N
PN
i=1 Yi(z)f o rz 2{ 0,1}.
The average causal e↵ect will not in general reﬂect the principal strata level causal
e↵ects. To see why, note that the average causal e↵ect can be rewritten as a weighted
average of the principal strata level causal e↵ects:
⌧ = ⇡NN⌧NN + ⇡RN⌧RN + ⇡NR⌧NR + ⇡RR⌧RR.
In most cases, ⌧ will di↵er from ⌧NN.M o r e o v e r ,n e i t h e r⌧ nor ⌧NN alone provide the
whole picture. To support this claim, we present three hypothetical examples, which
are summarized in Table 1.2. We exclude the RN stratum in these examples because
we believe it is plausible to assume that the placebo cannot prevent a subject from
being rescued (see Section 1.5.1 for more details). However, in complete generality
the RN stratum might exist. As in the MS trial, lower values of the response are
better outcomes.
Example 1.3.1 “The rescue medication dominates the active treatment”. The res-
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Table 1.2: Distinction between ⌧ and principal strata level e↵ects.
Example
Principal stratum level Overall
s⇡ s Y s(1) Y s(0) ⌧s Y (1) Y (0) ⌧
1.3.1
RR 0.05 0.75 0.75 0.00
1.00 1.40 -0.40 NR 0.05 1.25 0.25 1.00
NN 0.90 1.00 1.50 -0.50
1.3.2
RR 0.05 2.00 4.00 -2.00
1.00 1.40 -0.40 NR 0.05 1.50 2.50 -1.00
NN 0.90 0.92 1.20 -0.28
1.3.3
RR 0.05 4.40 4.40 0.00
1.00 1.40 -0.40 NR 0.05 3.00 3.26 -0.26
NN 0.90 0.70 1.13 -0.43
cue medication is the standard of care and is actually better than the active treatment
under study, which has a smaller causal e↵ect on the outcome, but it is more expensive
as well. The rescue medication under placebo helps the subjects in the NR principal
stratum more than the active treatment. For subjects in the RR principal stratum,
the rescue medication helps considerably under both assignments. Lastly, the active
treatment has a small e↵ect for subjects in the NN principal stratum. The average
causal e↵ects for the principal strata are ⌧RR =0 , ⌧NR =1 , and ⌧NN =  0.5.
Example 1.3.2 “The sicker a subject is, the more the active treatment helps”.A
plausible distinction between the RR, NR, and NN principal strata is that they consist
of the subjects with the worst, moderate, and best prognoses, respectively, because
being rescued post treatment is an indication of disease severity. The active treatment
is most e↵ective for patients with the worst prognosis and less e↵ective for better
prognoses. Rescue medication is not helpful relative to the active treatment. The
average causal e↵ects for the principal strata are ⌧RR =  2, ⌧NR =  1, and ⌧NN =
 0.28.
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Example 1.3.3 “A group of subjects is sick beyond help”. Again we assume that
the RR, NR, and NN principal strata consist of the subjects with the worst, moderate,
and best prognoses, respectively. Subjects belonging to the RR principal stratum are so
sick that neither the active treatment nor the rescue medication help them. Subjects
in the NR principal stratum have a slightly better prognosis, and beneﬁt more from
receiving the active treatment than the placebo and rescue medication. The treatment
works best for the mildly sick subjects in the NN principal stratum. The average causal
e↵ects for the principal strata are ⌧RR =0 , ⌧NR =  0.26, and ⌧NN =  0.43.
With these examples, we demonstrate that it is possible for ⌧ to be either smaller
or larger than ⌧NN,d e p e n d i n go nt h ec a u s a le ↵ e c t so fa s s i g n m e n tt ot r e a t m e n ti n
each principal stratum. Moreover, these examples show that considering all principal
strata level e↵ects are important for understanding the e↵ect of treatment and its
relation to receipt of additional rescue medication.
1.3.2 Observed outcomes
Of course, only one potential outcome is ever observed because each subject is
only assigned to one treatment. Let Zi be the indicator for the assignment of unit
i: Zi is 1 if subject i is assigned to the active treatment, and Zi is 0 if subject i is
assigned to placebo. The clinical endpoint that is observed is Y obs
i = Yi(Zi)a n dt h e
observed indicator of receipt of rescue medication is Dobs
i = Di(Zi).
In general, the indicator of treatment assignment and the observed indicator of
rescue medication do not provide enough information to determine the principal stra-
tum of each subject. To see why, consider a subject who is assigned to the active
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treatment (i.e., Zi =1 )a n di so b s e r v e dt ob er e s c u e d( i . e . ,Dobs
i =1 ) .W ek n o wt h i s
subject belongs either to the always rescued (RR) principal stratum or to the rescued
under treatment (RN) principal stratum, but because we do not observe this subject
under the placebo, we cannot determine to which of these two principal strata the
subject actually belongs.
Now consider every combination of treatment assignment and observed indicator
of receipt of rescue medication. We denote
O(z,d)={i : Zi = z and D
obs
i = d}
for z 2{ 0,1} and d 2{ 0,1}.T h eO notation evokes “observed groups”. The possible
membership to certain principal strata for each of the four combinations of treatment
assignment and observed indicator of rescue medication are detailed in Table 1.3.
Although the principal stratum of any one individual is not identiﬁed in general,
the principal stratiﬁcation framework brings clarity to the idea that the observed
indicator of rescue medication is not enough information to characterize whether or
not a subject takes only the active treatment and only the placebo. Ignoring or
misusing the observed indicator of rescue medication leads to misleading conclusions
about the e↵ect of taking the active treatment compared to taking the placebo.
Table 1.3: Observed and latent groups.
Assignment Rescued O(Zi,D obs
i ) Si
Active treatment
Yes O(1,1) RR or RN
No O(1,0) NR or NN
Placebo
Yes O(0,1) RR or NR
No O(0,0) NN or RN
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1.4 Other methods of analysis
We review some methods for analyzing data from clinical trials with early escape
designs. An important characteristic of the principal stratiﬁcation approach is that it
starts by deﬁning the estimand, that is, the quantity of scientiﬁc interest. Separating
the estimand from estimation keeps the goal of the study clear. We assert that
this separation is one of the main distinctions between the principal stratiﬁcation
framework and other methods of analysis that focus on estimators.
1.4.1 Intention-to-treat analysis
As discussed, ITT analysis compares all subjects assigned to the active treatment
to all subjects assigned to the placebo regardless of the treatments actually received.
The di↵erence of the observed means in the treatment and control groups is an unbi-
ased ITT estimator of the average causal e↵ect, ⌧ as deﬁned in (1.1). In clinical trials,
randomization validates the ITT analysis, but ITT answers questions about causal
e↵ects of assignment to active treatment versus assignment to placebo. However,
in an early escape design, ITT does not address the e↵ects of receipt of only active
treatment versus only placebo.
1.4.2 Discarding rescued subjects
An analysis that discards rescued subjects removes all subjects who were rescued.
One such estimator is the di↵erence in means of subjects assigned to the active treat-
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ment versus placebo for subjects observed to be not rescued. That is,
ˆ  dr =
X
i2O(1,0)
Y
obs
i
X
i2O(1,0)
1
 
X
i2O(0,0)
Y
obs
i
X
i2O(0,0)
1
, (1.2)
is an estimator that discards rescued subjects, but it is not clear what ˆ  dr estimates.
The “dr” subscript evokes “discard rescued”.
The problem with this approach is that it only discards subjects that were res-
cued under the observed treatment assignment. Consequently, the two groups being
compared are not a common set of subjects (see Table 1.3). The subjects who are
assigned to the active treatment and are observed to be not rescued belong to either
the rescued under placebo (NR) or the never rescued (NN) principal strata. The sub-
jects who are assigned to the placebo and are observed to be not rescued belong to
either the rescued under treatment (RN) or the never rescued (NN) principal strata.
An analysis that discards rescued subjects does not estimate a causal e↵ect because
it is a comparison of potential outcomes between two dissimilar groups.
To see this issue analytically, we see that ˆ  dr estimates  dr where
 dr =
⇡NNY NN(1) + ⇡NRY NR(1)
⇡NN + ⇡NR
 
⇡NNY NN(0) + ⇡RNY RN(0)
⇡NN + ⇡RN
=⌧NN +
⇡NR
⇡NN + ⇡NR
 
Y NR(1)   Y NN(1)
 
+
⇡RN
⇡NN + ⇡RN
 
Y NN(0)   Y RN(0)
 
.
By “estimates”, we mean ˆ  dr is a biased estimate of  dr under repeated randomization
of assignment to treatment with a bias that goes to zero as N increases (details are
in Appendix A.1). Clearly, this estimand is not in general the same as ⌧NN.
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One case in which  dr equals ⌧NN is when ⇡NR = ⇡RN =0 .T h i sc a s ec o r r e s p o n d s
to the testable assumption that the active treatment has no e↵ect on the receipt of
rescue medication, or that Di(0) = Di(1) for all i =1 ,...,N.I no u rc a s es t u d y ,t h e
small p-value from the “Rescued” row of Table 1.1 suggests that this assumption does
not hold.
1.4.3 Rescue as a “bad” outcome
White et al. (2001) remark that being rescued can be perceived as a bad prog-
nostic outcome. Indeed, in the MS clinical trial, the decision to give subjects rescue
medication was based on progression of the disease. In such a case, White et al. (2001)
suggest imputing a “bad underlying outcome to rescued patients and use rank-based
methods of analysis”. The goal of such an approach is to estimate the e↵ect of the
active treatment compared to the placebo for the entire sample under a hypothetical
alternative experiment that had no early escape protocol (i.e., the one versus none
comparison from White et al., 2003).
This description would beneﬁt from expanding the notation of the potential out-
comes to allow the outcomes to be a function of receipt of rescue medication. We
expand the notation for just this section. Let Yi(z,d)b et h ep o t e n t i a lo u t c o m ew h e r e
z 2{ 0,1} indicates which treatment a subject is assigned to, and d 2{ 0,1} indicates
whether or not a subject receives rescue medication. The one versus none comparison
is an estimand that compares Yi(1,0) to Yi(0,0) for all subjects.
Expanding the potential outcomes changes the problem from deﬁning di↵erent
underlying principal strata to considering the causal e↵ect of receipt of rescue med-
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ication. A crucial component of the RCM is the assignment mechanism, which is
unknown for the receipt of rescue medication because it is based on physicians’ subjec-
tive opinions of the putative (or possibly observed) outcome of interest. An unknown
assignment mechanism means that rescue medication is not under the control of the
experimenter and puts this causal inference question in the domain of observational
studies.
White et al. (2001) attempt to obviate this problem by imputing a “bad” potential
outcome for rescued subjects and using a rank-based analysis. Using rank-based
methods implicitly changes the estimand of interest. For example, after imputing the
bad outcomes, if the median of the subjects assigned to active treatment is compared
to the median of the subjects assigned to placebo, then the estimand is the di↵erence
in medians of the potential outcomes under active treatment and placebo with no
rescue medication; that is, we estimate
median{Yi(1,0) : i =1 ,...,N} median{Yi(0,0) : i =1 ,...,N}.
The di↵erence in medians is a reasonable estimand, but such an estimand should be
scientiﬁcally motivated (e.g., when the outcome distribution is believed to be skewed).
The early escape design should not dictate the choice of estimand.
1.5 Parametric estimation for MS clinical trial
We conduct a Bayesian parametric analysis of the MS clinical trial described in
Section 1.2. The goal is to estimate ⌧NN,t h ea v e r a g ec a u s a le ↵ e c tf o rt h en e v e r
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rescued stratum. We also estimate the average causal e↵ects in the other principal
strata. Additional estimands include the proportion of subjects within each stratum,
the average potential outcomes by treatment, and the overall average causal e↵ect.
We view the unobserved principal strata membership and the missing potential
outcome for the clinical endpoint for each subject as missing data. Our estimation
strategy involves multiply imputing all the missing data using a Bayesian model
(Rubin, 2009). First we impose structural and stochastic assumptions on the principal
strata and the potential outcomes models, respectively. Then we provide explicit
parametric models for the complete data, which include the indicator of treatment
assignment, principal strata membership, and both potential outcomes for the clinical
endpoint. The latent strata and missing potential outcomes are then imputed from
their posterior predictive distribution given the observed data. Our estimands are
simple functions of the completed data, thus every imputation provides a posterior
draw of the estimands.
1.5.1 Assumptions
Monotonicity
We assume monotonicity on the principal strata. In terms of potential outcomes
notation, this assumption implies Di(1)  Di(0) for all subjects i.I n t u i t i v e l y , t h e
interpretation is that no subject would require rescue medication under the active
treatment but not under the placebo. Monotonicity a priori precludes the existence
of the RN principal stratum. This assumption is credible for receipt of rescue medi-
cation in a placebo-controlled clinical trial because the decision to administer rescue
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medication is based on how well the subject responds to the assigned treatment, and
it is unlikely that the active treatment is worse than the placebo. For our example,
if a subject requires rescue medication under the treatment that is suspected to slow
down MS progression, then it is plausible that this subject would also require rescue
medication under the placebo, which is known to have no biological e↵ect. Similarly,
if a subject does not require rescue medication under the inactive placebo, then this
subject would not require rescue medication under the active treatment, which is not
believed to have negative e↵ects on MS progression. In other trials, this assumption
may not be as plausible.
Stochastic dominance
We assume a stochastic ordering on the potential outcomes of the clinical endpoint
between certain principal strata. Namely, the assumptions follow from the argument
that the RR, NR, and NN principal strata correspond to the worst, moderate, and best
prognostic groups. Thus, the NN principal stratum should have better outcomes than
the NR principal stratum under the active treatment because subjects in both strata
receive only the active treatment when assigned the active treatment. We encode
this assumption through stochastic dominance of the potential outcome under active
treatment in the NR principal stratum over the NN principal stratum (recalling that
a lower number of relapses is better). Similarly, the NR principal stratum should have
better outcomes than the RR principal stratum under the placebo because subjects
in both strata receive placebo and rescue medication when assigned the placebo. We
encode this assumption through stochastic dominance of the potential outcome under
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the placebo in the RR principal stratum over the NR principal stratum.
Stochastic dominance is an assumption on the distribution of potential outcomes.
More explicitly, our ﬁrst stochastic dominance assumption implies that for subject i
in the NN principal stratum and subject i0 in the NR principal stratum,
Pr(Yi0(1)  y | Si0 = NR,✓)  Pr(Yi(1)  y | Si = NN,✓)
for all possible y and ✓ is a vector parameter governing the distributions. A similar
deﬁnition applies to our second stochastic dominance assumption. Later, we make
both of these assumptions explicit with respect to a parametric model and conditional
on covariates.
1.5.2 Complete data model
We start with a model for the complete data given pre-treatment covariates and
parameters. For subject i,t h ec o m p l e t ed a t aa r ec o m p o s e do ft h ei n d i c a t o ro ft r e a t -
ment assignment, Zi; the potential outcomes for the primary endpoint under assign-
ment to placebo and active treatment, Yi(0) and Yi(1) respectively; and the principal
strata membership Si (or equivalently, both potential outcomes of the indicator of res-
cue under assignment to placebo and active treatment, Di(0) and Di(1) respectively).
We denote the indicator for site (or hospital) for each unit as the 99-dimensional col-
umn vector X
h
i,w h e r e“ h ”e v o k e s“ h o s p i t a l ” . W ed e n o t et h eﬁ v ep r e - t r e a t m e n t
covariates introduced in Section 1.2 with the ﬁve-dimensional column vector Xi,a n d
the vector of parameters as ✓.T h eﬁ v eb i n a r yc o v a r i a t e sl i s t e di nT a b l e1 . 1a r eb e -
lieved to be predictive of the outcome of number of relapses and are coded as -1 and
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1. The complete data likelihood factorizes as follows:
p(Zi,Y i(0),Y i(1),S i | X
h
i,Xi,✓)=p(Zi | Yi(0),Y i(1),S i,X
h
i,Xi,✓
Z)
⇥ p(Yi(0),Y i(1) | Si,X
h
i,Xi,✓
Y)
⇥ p(Si | X
h
i,Xi,✓
S),
where ✓ =( ✓
Z,✓
S,✓
Y). We consider each term individually.
Treatment assignment model
As discussed in Section 1.2, the trial was randomized within site (or hospital).
Thus, given the site, the treatment assignment indicator is independent of everything
else: assignment to treatment is unconfounded. That is,
p(Zi | Yi(0),Y i(1),S i,X
h
i,Xi,✓
Z)=p(Zi| X
h
i).
Treatment assignment does not depend on any unknown parameters.
Principal strata model
With the monotonicity assumption, subjects belong to one of three principal
strata. We model the probability of membership to the NN principal stratum (i.e.,
the healthiest group) versus the NR and RR principal strata (i.e., the unhealthier
groups) with a logistic regression:
⇡NN,i =P r ( Si = NN | Xi,✓
S)=e x p i t (  NN + X
>
i  NN,X).
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where expit(l)=1 /(1 + e l). Given that a subject does not belong to the NN prin-
cipal stratum, the conditional probability of belonging to the NR principal stratum
(i.e., moderately healthy group) versus the RR principal strata (i.e., the unhealthiest
group) is also modeled with a logistic regression:
⇡RN|¬NN,i =P r ( Si = NR | Si 2{ NR or RR},Xi,✓
S)=e x p i t (  NR + X
>
i  NR,X)
The conditional nature of  NR and  NR,X is suppressed for notational convenience.
The unconditional probability of belonging the NR principal strata is
⇡NR,i =P r ( Si = NR | Xi,✓
S)=⇡RN|¬NN,i · (1   ⇡NN,i)
We have ✓
S =(  NN,  NR, NN,X, NR,X).
We do not include information on site in this model and therefore suppress X
h
i
from the notation. The implicit assumption is that the covariates, Xi,p r o v i d ee n o u g h
information to ignore possible di↵erences across the 99 sites. A more complete analysis
would incorporate possible di↵erences in sites with a hierarchical model (Gelman
et al., 2003, Chapter 5).
Primary endpoint model
We model the number of relapses with a Poisson distribution, which is commonly
employed in MS research. This model is conditional on both covariates and principal
strata membership. As in the principal strata model, we suppress X
h
i from the
notation. For every treatment assignment and principal stratum combination, we
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marginally model the potential outcome using a Poisson regression:
Yi(z) | Si = s,Xi,✓
Y ⇠ Poi( z,s,i),
where
log z,s,i =  z,s + X
>
i  z,s,X
and z 2{ 0,1} and s 2{ RR,NR,NN}. We simplify this general model to have con-
stant coe cients for the covariates, so  z,s,X =  X for all assigned treatment and prin-
cipal stratum combinations. We have ✓
Y =(  0,RR,  0,NR,  0,NN,  1,RR,  1,NR,  1,NN, X).
We assume conditional independence between Yi(0) and Yi(1).
The stochastic dominance assumption manifests in terms of inequalities on the
parameters of the outcome model. First, stochastic dominance of the NR princi-
pal stratum over the NN principal stratum for the potential outcome under active
treatment implies  1,NR    1,NN. Second, stochastic dominance of the RR princi-
pal stratum over the NR principal stratum for the potential outcome under placebo
implies  0,RR    0,NR.
1.5.3 Imputation of missing data
Observed data likelihood
Both potential outcomes are never jointly observed, so we work from the observed
data likelihood, which integrates over the missing data. The observed likelihood
is decomposed into four combinations of treatment assignment and observed rescue
status. Under monotonicity, subjects that are rescued under the active treatment
22Chapter 1: A principal stratiﬁcation approach to receipt of rescue medication
belong to the always rescued principal stratum because they would have also been
rescued under the placebo. Likewise, subjects that are not rescued under placebo
belong to the never rescued principal stratum because they would not require rescue
medication under the active treatment. In contrast, the principal stratum of subjects
rescued under placebo cannot be uniquely identiﬁed from the observed data because
they could have been either rescued or not rescued under the active treatment. These
subjects contribute a Poisson ﬁnite mixture probability with two components to the
likelihood. A similar argument applies to subjects that are not rescued under the
active treatment because they could have been either rescued or not rescued under
the placebo. These subjects also contribute a Poisson ﬁnite mixture probability with
two components to the likelihood. The observed data likelihood is
L(✓ | Z,Y
obs,D
obs,X) /
Y
i2O(1,1)
⇡RR,i · Poi(Y
obs
i ; 1,RR,i)
⇥
Y
i2O(1,0)
⇡NN,i · Poi(Y
obs
i ; 1,NN,i)+⇡NR,i · Poi(Y
obs
i ; 1,NR,i)
⇥
Y
i2O(0,1)
⇡NR,i · Poi(Y
obs
i ; 0,NR,i)+⇡RR,i · Poi(Y
obs
i ; 0,RR,i)
⇥
Y
i2O(0,0)
⇡NN,i · Poi(Y
obs
i ; 0,NN,i)
⇥ { 1,NR    1,NN} { 0,RR    0,NR},
where Poi(y; )i st h ep r o b a b i l i t ym a s sf u n c t i o no ft h eP o i s s o nd i s t r i b u t i o nw i t hm e a n
 >0e v a l u a t e da ty =0 ,1,...; Z, Yobs,a n dDobs are vectors composed of the values
Zi, Y obs
i ,a n dDobs
i for i =1 ,...,N respectively; and X is an N ⇥5m a t r i xw i t hr o w s
X
>
i for i =1 ,...,N. The last line is a product of indicator functions that enforces
the stochastic dominance assumption.
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Prior distributions
We use informative proper prior distributions for the parameters in order to en-
sure a proper posterior distribution. Our choice of hyperparameters induces a prior
distribution on the ﬁnite population parameters, which are summarized in Table 1.4.
All prior distributions are relatively di↵use and cover a plausible range of values. All
causal e↵ects have medians near or at zero.
We assume normal prior distributions for all parameters. The prior distributions
for  RR,X and  NR,X are independent normal distributions with mean 0 and variance
1f o re a c he n t r y . T h ep r i o rd i s t r i b u t i o n sf o r RR and  NR are independent normal
distributions with mean -2.89 and variance 1. The prior distributions for  X are
independent normal distributions with mean 0 and variance 1 for each entry.
The prior distributions on the remaining parameters,  z,s, were chosen to ensure
three characteristics: (1) we target a median of Y NN(0) of approximately 0.5 based
on the results in the placebo arms of similar clinical trials (Gold et al., 2013; Polman
et al., 2006; Gold et al., 2012; Fox et al., 2012); (2) we require our two stochastic
dominance assumptions, that is  1,NR    1,NN and  0,RR    0,NR,a n d( 3 )w et a r g e t
an “approximately null” distribution of causal e↵ects by setting E( 0,RR)=E (  1,RR),
E( 0,NR)=E (  1,NR), and E( 0,NN)=E (  1,NN). Speciﬁcally,  1,RR is distributed as a
normal distribution with mean 0.16 and variance 1;  1,NR and  1,NN are distributed as
the maximum and minimum respectively of two independent normal random variables
with mean -1.53 and variance 1;  0,NN is distributed as a normal distribution with
mean -2.09 and variance 1; and  0,RR and  0,NR are distributed as the maximum and
minimum respectively of two independent normal random variables with mean -0.4
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and variance 1. Characteristic (3) is guaranteed by the moments of the maximum
of two normal random variables (Clark, 1961), (2) is guaranteed by the imposed
orderings, and (1) is conﬁrmed in Table 1.4.
Table 1.4: Summaries of the prior distributions of several estimands. Outcome values
are right skewed, so the median and quantiles provide better summaries of centrality
and spread than the mean and standard deviation, respectively.
Estimand Mean Std. Dev. Median 2.5 Percentile 97.5 Percentile
⇡RR 0.116 0.11 0.078 0.006 0.421
⇡NR 0.116 0.11 0.079 0.006 0.423
⇡NN 0.768 0.17 0.812 0.342 0.980
Y RR(1) 24.453 192.02 3.601 0.092 155.230
Y NR(1) 7.595 59.58 1.143 0.014 40.106
Y NN(1) 2.105 8.87 0.474 0.031 13.273
Y (1) 5.551 50.076 1.09 0.086 32.014
Y RR(0) 25.093 262.34 3.538 0.125 143.310
Y NR(0) 7.304 65.82 1.144 0.016 43.568
Y NN(0) 2.687 18.95 0.469 0.025 15.792
Y (0) 5.766 48.45 1.091 0.081 33.023
⌧RR -0.640 202.68 0.000 -71.761 83.521
⌧NR 0.291 44.39 0.000 -20.597 20.305
⌧NN -0.582 16.23 0.007 -8.816 6.410
⌧ -0.215 41.06 0.001 -13.527 13.433
Posterior sampling
Posterior samples of the parameters were drawn using STAN software (Stan De-
velopment Team, 2013). STAN implements the No-U-Turn sampler (Ho↵man and
Gelman, 2011), a variant of Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (Duane et al., 1987). Ten
chains of 20,000 iterations were run simultaneously in order to assess convergence.
All potential scale reduction factors were below 1.001 for all parameters (Gelman and
Rubin, 1992). No stochastic dominance assumptions were enforced while sampling
the posterior distribution. A sample of parameters following stochastic dominance
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was obtained through rejection sampling. That is, we only use the posterior samples
for which both stochastic dominance assumptions are true. Software was veriﬁed us-
ing a simulation based procedure (results in Appendix A.3, see Cook et al., 2006, for
details on the procedure). Model ﬁt was assessed using posterior predictive checks
(results in Appendix A.4, see Rubin et al., 1984, for details on the procedure).
Imputing missing potential outcomes
The observed data include the observed indicator of receipt of rescue medication
and the observed clinical outcome, which constitute half of the potential outcomes.
We multiply impute the missing potential outcomes given the observed data and a
posterior sample of the parameters (Rubin, 2009). First, we impute principal stratum
membership for the subjects who could belong to two possible principal strata. Next,
given the imputed principal stratum for each subject (and the posterior sample of
the parameters), we can impute the missing potential outcome of number of relapses
within one year under the alternative treatment. The details for the imputation are
provided in Appendix A.2. Once all missing data are imputed, we have a posterior
sample of the complete data, from which calculating all estimands of interest is trivial.
Each fully imputed dataset—or completed dataset—leads to one posterior draw of
the estimands given the observed data.
There is a non-zero probability of imputing no subjects that belong to the NR
principal stratum. We assume a priori that this principal stratum exists because the
treatment appears to have an e↵ect on receipt of rescue medication (see Table 1.1).
Based on this assumption, we exclude the posterior samples of the completed data
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that had no subjects in the NR principal stratum (0.4% of the posterior sample).
Figure 1.1 shows the posterior distribution of the three principal strata level ef-
fects; the posterior distribution is superimposed over the prior distribution for easy
comparison. We see that the posterior distribution of the average causal e↵ect for the
never rescued principal stratum has a smaller variance relative to its prior distribution.
The same is true for the always rescued principal stratum. The posterior distribu-
tion of the average causal e↵ect for the NR principal stratum is less concentrated
than the other two principal strata. Even with a parametric model and stochastic
dominance assumptions, estimating the e↵ects in this group is di cult. The general
reason is that no subjects are ever completely identiﬁed to belong to this stratum,
whereas with the monotonicity assumption, subjects in observed groups O(1,1) and
O(0,0) are identiﬁed to be in the always rescued and never rescued principal strata
respectively. Moreover, for this particular problem, the rescued under placebo prin-
cipal stratum is composed of approximately 3% of the sample (or about 25 subjects),
which is a small number of observations for estimating the log means of the potential
outcomes (i.e.,  0,NR and  1,NR)w i t h i nt w od i ↵ e r e n tt w oc o m p o n e n tm i x t u r em o d e l s .
1.5.4 Results
Summaries of the posterior distributions of all estimands of interest are provided
in Table 1.5. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show the histograms of the posterior (and prior)
distributions of the average causal e↵ects within strata and overall, respectively.
We estimate that 3.2% and 2.4% of the sample belong to the always rescued and
rescued under placebo principal strata respectively. The remaining 94.4% belong to
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Figure 1.1: Posterior (and prior) distributions of the average causal e↵ects within the
a) always rescued, b) rescued under placebo, and c) never rescued principal strata.
Posterior distributions are plotted in dark grey and prior distributions are plotted in
light grey.
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Figure 1.2: Posterior (and prior) distribution(s) of the overall average causal e↵ect.
Posterior distribution plotted in dark grey and prior distribution plotted in light grey.
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Table 1.5: Summaries of the posterior distributions of several estimands.
Estimand Mean Std. Dev. Median 2.5th Percentile 97.5th
⇡RR 0.032 0.004 0.032 0.024 0.039
⇡NR 0.024 0.013 0.022 0.004 0.053
⇡NN 0.944 0.010 0.946 0.921 0.959
Y RR(1) 1.408 0.188 1.393 1.077 1.812
Y NR(1) 0.541 0.362 0.469 0.000 1.400
Y NN(1) 0.199 0.014 0.200 0.171 0.225
Y (1) 0.246 0.013 0.245 0.222 0.274
Y RR(0) 2.864 0.459 2.818 2.120 3.900
Y NR(0) 2.021 0.707 2.065 0.444 3.308
Y NN(0) 0.515 0.037 0.514 0.446 0.591
Y (0) 0.630 0.045 0.626 0.548 0.724
⌧RR -1.456 0.504 -1.417 -2.560 -0.586
⌧NR -1.480 0.805 -1.550 -2.889 0.300
⌧NN -0.316 0.039 -0.315 -0.397 -0.242
⌧ -0.384 0.049 -0.382 -0.485 -0.295
the never rescued principal stratum. The overall causal average e↵ect of assignment
to treatment, ⌧,i sar e d u c t i o no f0 . 3 8r e l a p s e so na v e r a g e .
Within the never rescued principal stratum, our inference shows that receipt of
only the active treatment reduces the number of relapses in one year compared to re-
ceipt of only the placebo. The estimated e↵ect is an average reduction of 0.32 relapses.
Additionally, our analysis shows that assignment to treatment is still e↵ective, and
in fact more e↵ective, for subjects in the always rescued and rescued under placebo
principal strata; the estimated average causal e↵ects for these strata are a reduction
of 1.46 and 1.48 relapses, respectively. These estimates suggest an explanation similar
to “the sicker a subject is, the more the active treatment helps” example because the
average e↵ects for the never rescued and rescued under placebo principal strata are
larger in magnitude than the average e↵ect for never rescued principal stratum.
Estimation of the principal strata level e↵ects shows that receipt of treatment
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is indeed more e↵ective than receipt of placebo within the never rescued group of
patients. Our analysis additionally characterizes the causal e↵ects in the other two
principal strata. Although it is hard to disentangle the possible e↵ects of the rescue
medication, the assignment to treatment still beneﬁts subjects requiring some rescue
medication.
1.6 Conclusion
We described the problem of administering rescue medication after treatment has
been randomized in a clinical trial. The principal stratiﬁcation framework clariﬁes
the di culties of these early escape designs as well as deﬁnes a group for which the
desired comparison of receipt of only active treatment and receipt of only placebo is
appropriate.
There are several extensions of this work that might occur in practice. For in-
stance, we have ignored the temporal aspect of when rescue medications are actually
given to the patient. We ignore this issue in our example for two reasons: ﬁrst, the bi-
nary indicator of receipt of rescue medication is easier to understand, and second, the
additional complication of dealing with continuous principal strata is probably not
required for such a small number of rescued patients. If an early escape design took
place over a long period of time with a larger proportion of observed patients requir-
ing rescue medication (e.g., see the example in White et al., 2001), then considering
the principal strata of time of rescue under active treatment and control would be an
important extension. Such extensions could follow similar work on partial compliance
(e.g., Jin and Rubin, 2008).
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Another application could be to active-control trials, or non-inferiority trials. Al-
though the ethical issues are of less concern, early escape designs are still appropriate
because patients that do not respond to the assigned treatment may beneﬁt from ad-
ditional rescue medication. An additional complication might be the violation of some
of our assumptions. For example, the monotonicity assumption seems reasonable in
a placebo-controlled trial because the placebo is inactive, but with an active-control
trial, we can envision that some subjects might beneﬁt more under the control treat-
ment than the experimental treatment and vice versa.
We detailed a parametric Bayesian inference with strong, plausible assumptions
to estimate the di↵erent principal strata level e↵ects. Other estimation methods have
been proposed, including large sample bounds (Balke and Pearl, 1997; Zhang and
Rubin, 2003), sensitivity analysis (Gilbert et al., 2003; Hudgens and Halloran, 2006),
and randomization-based inference (Rosenbaum, 1996; Nolen and Hudgens, 2011).
Future work might apply these approaches to estimation of causal e↵ects in early
escape designs.
Principal stratiﬁcation is a general framework that describes latent groups based
on post-treatment variables under both treatments. Causal estimands are well de-
ﬁned for these principal strata. In contrast, methods that rely only on the observed
outcomes—like analyses that discard rescued subjects—fail to consider what would
have happened under the alternative treatment. Similar observations apply to “per-
protocol” and “as-treated” analyses of randomized experiments with imperfect com-
pliance (Angrist et al., 1996).
The principal stratiﬁcation framework also addresses the issue of non-compliance
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in another ethically motivated design, the encouragement design (Hirano et al., 2000),
in which subjects are randomly assigned to either be encouraged to take a treatment
(e.g., a mailing that reminds subjects to get an inﬂuenza vaccine) or not encour-
aged (e.g., no mailing). The treatment is not withheld from individuals on ethical
grounds. Perhaps knowledge of how to handle conceptually post-treatment variables
can motivate designs that address other ethical concerns.
We provided an example of estimation of principal strata level e↵ects for subjects
that receive additional rescue medication in early escape designs. Previously, early
escape designs were thought to be only useful for determining e↵ects of treatment
versus placebo up until the ﬁrst receipt of rescue medication (Temple, 1994; FDA,
2001). However, we showed that we can estimate the causal e↵ect of receipt of active
treatment compared to receipt of placebo for the never rescued principal stratum.
Moreover, within the other principal strata, the e↵ects of assignment to treatment are
important for understanding the e↵ect of the treatment even when rescue medication
is required. We hope that our example and the general framework provide evidence
for the further use of early escape designs that alleviate the ethical dilemma of treating
patients with an inactive placebo.
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Randomization-based intervals for
binary outcomes
2.1 Introduction
Fisher (1935, page 17) called randomization in experiments the “physical basis of
the validity” of the randomization test that assumes the sharp null hypothesis of ab-
solutely no treatment e↵ect. Fisher’s randomization test is appealing because it pro-
vides simple, non-parametric inference for assessing causal e↵ects (Pitman, 1937a,b,
1938). Rejecting the null hypothesis leads to the “dull” conclusion that there is at
least one unit for which the treatment does have an e↵ect. Although inverting sets of
hypothesis tests of constant additive e↵ects provides interval estimates of the average
causal e↵ect, with binary outcomes, non-zero additive e↵ects either are -1 or 1 and are
generally contradicted by observed data. We formally treat the problem of testing a
null hypotheses for the average causal e↵ect in the case of binary outcomes using the
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randomization employed in the experiment as our primary inferential tool. Inverting
such tests provide interval estimates of the average causal e↵ect.
For binary outcomes, a hypothesis with respect to the average causal e↵ect can
be deﬁned, but necessarily requires the introduction of nuisance unknowns that com-
plicate the testing procedure. For example, if the null hypothesis asserts that the
treatment protects against disease for exactly one unit, we cannot know if that one
unit was observed to be a non-diseased person assigned to treatment or a diseased
person assigned to control, and thus we are unable to ﬁll-in the missing potential
outcomes to continue with a randomization test. We propose the interpretation of
Fisher’s randomization test as a special case of a posterior predictive check as way to
test null hypotheses of average causal e↵ects (Rubin et al., 1984).
In Section 2.2, we describe the situation with a completely randomized exper-
iment. After some background and review, the problem of nuisance unknowns is
demonstrated with a simple heuristic and then generalized. In section 2.3 we suggest
as o l u t i o nu s i n gp o s t e r i o rp r e d i c t i v ec h e c k sa n dd i s c u s so t h e ra p p r o a c h e s .S e c t i o n2 . 4
provides toy examples including an application to a small dataset and evaluation of
repeated sampling frequentist properties. In Section 2.5 we discuss extensions of our
procedure as well as limitations.
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2.2 Analysis of a completely randomized experi-
ment
2.2.1 Background
The Rubin Causal Model (Rubin, 1978a; Holland, 1986) forms the basis of our
entire discussion. Consider comparing a binary outcome under an active treat-
ment and control treatment for N units. For concreteness, consider outcome 1 as
“diseased” and 0 as “non-diseased”. We now denote the potential outcomes for
unit i under control and active treatments as Yi(0) and Yi(1), respectively. Let
Y(w)> =( Y1(w),...,Y N(w))> for w =0 ,1; Y =[ Y(0),Y(1)], an N ⇥ 2a r r a yo f
all potential outcomes; and Y be the set of all possible N ⇥ 2a r r a y sw i t he n t r i e so f
0o r1s ot h a tY 2Y.L e tWi be the treatment indicator for unit i =1 ,...,N,w i t h
Wi =
8
> > > <
> > > :
1i f u n i t i received active treatment,
0o t h e r w i s e ,
and let W> =( W1,...,W N)>.W r i t i n gt h ep o t e n t i a lo u t c o m e sa saf u n c t i o no fo n l y
the unit indicator of treatment requires the stable unit treatment value sssumption
(SUTVA Rubin, 1980), which is assumed throughout.
Assumption 1 SUTVA: There is no interference among units or hidden varieties
of treatments.
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The estimand of interest is the average causal e↵ect,
⌧ = Y (1)   Y (0),
where
Y (w)=
1
N
X
i
Yi(w)
for w =0 ,1. The estimand ⌧ is a ﬁnite population estimand deﬁned in terms of
potentially observable data.
We consider a completely randomized experiment where M units are randomly
assigned to treatment and the other N   M units are assigned to control. After
assignment, we denote yobs,i to be the observed potential outcome for unit i,t h a ti s
yobs,i = WiYi(1) + (1   Wi)Yi(0).
Let y>
obs =( yobs,1,...,y obs,N)>.
We deﬁne additional “aggregated” notation. We call N =( N00,N01,N10,N11)
the aggregated potential outcomes where
N
yy0
=
X
i
1{Yi(1) = y,Yi(0) = y
0} for y,y
0 2{ 0,1}.
The four values of the aggregated potential outcomes correspond to the number
of units in the four principal strata corresponding to the “immune”, “protected”,
“harmed”, and “doomed” stratum respectively (Hudgens and Halloran, 2006; Fran-
gakis and Rubin, 2002). For example, N01 is the number of units for whom treatment
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protects against disease. We have N = N00 + N01 + N10 + N11 and ⌧ = N10 N01
N .
Similarly, we call M =( M00,M01,M10,M11)t h etreated unit aggregated potential
outcomes where
M
yy0
=
X
i
Wi1{Yi(1) = y,Yi(0) = y
0} for y,y
0 2{ 0,1}.
The treated unit aggregated potential outcomes counts the number of units assigned
to treatment within the four principal strata. Rosenbaum (2001) deﬁnes the e↵ect
attributable to treatment as M01.
Lastly, call y =( yc,y t)t h eaggregated observed data where
yc =
X
i
(1   Wi)yobs,i and yt =
X
i
Wiyobs,i.
Our goal is to perform inference for ⌧ using only the random assignment of
treatments. We ﬁrst review randomization-based inference under Fisher’s sharp null
(FSN).
2.2.2 A simple sharp null
Although only one potential outcome can ever be observed for any unit, a sharp
null hypothesis, by deﬁnition, yields all potential outcomes for all observed units when
combined with the observed data. The appeal of a sharp null hypothesis is that the
randomization distribution of any test statistic can be determined by considering all
possible randomizations.
In terms of potential outcomes, FSN of absolutely no treatment e↵ect is expressed
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Table 2.1: Observed counts of non-diseased and diseased units by treatment
Non-diseased Diseased
Control N   M   yc yc N   M
Treated M   yt yt M
N   yc   yt yc + yt N
as Yi(0) = Yi(1) for i =1 ,...,N. Clearly, FSN is sharp. Table 2.1 characterizes
the outcomes under FSN. For ﬁnite population inference, there is no debate over
conditioning on margin totals in this table: row totals are ﬁxed by a completely
randomized design and column totals are ﬁxed by virtue of FSN. Fisher’s random-
ization test follows by noting that the (Treated, Diseased) cell in Table 2.1 has a
hypergeometric(yc +yt,N yc  yt,M ) distribution under repeated randomizations
of the same units and FSN. Randomization based inference follows from considering
repeated randomizations of the same set of units who have ﬁxed potential outcomes,
which are assumed known by hypothesis.
The Bayesian perspective provides another interpretation of Fisher’s randomiza-
tion test, with conditioning on the data following naturally. Rubin et al. (1984)
formulated this test as a posterior predictive check (PPC): it is a posteriori,b e i n g
conditional on the data, and predictive, repeating the same experiment with the same
units. A PPC calculates the following probability
ppp =P r
 
T(y
pp
obs,W
pp)   T(yobs,W) | yobs,W
 
, (2.1)
where y
pp
obs and Wpp are the data for the predictive experiment and T is a test
statistic, for which large values correspond to extremes. Under FSN, the PPC is
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equivalent to Fisher’s randomization test, but the former generally provides a more
ﬂexible framework.
Rejecting FSN leads to the conclusion that there is some unit i for which Yi(0) 6=
Yi(1). Such a conclusion is not particularly interesting and leads us to consider more
scientiﬁcally relevant hypotheses.
2.2.3 A Simple Dull Null Hypothesis
We ﬁrst illustrate with an example of what goes wrong with a hypothesis for a
speciﬁc case of ⌧ = ⌧0. Consider the hypothesis that FSN holds for all units except
one, for whom the treatment protects against disease (i.e., there exists one unit i0 such
that Yi0(0) >Y i0(1) and Yi(0) = Yi(1) for i 6= i0). Under this hypothesis, ⌧ =   1
N.F o r
units assigned to control, observing Yi(0) = 0 implies Yi(1) = 0, but if Yi(0) = 1, then
Yi(1) = 0 or Yi(1) = 1. Similarly, for units assigned to treatment, observing Yi(1) = 1
implies Yi(0) = 1, but if Yi(1) = 0, then Yi(0) = 0 or Yi(0) = 1. We know both
potential outcomes for the yt diseased units assigned to treatment and N   M   yc
non-diseased units assigned to control, but we cannot determine which one of the
M   yt non-diseased units assigned to treatment or yc diseased units assigned to
control is the protected unit if M  yt+yc > 1. The simple hypothesis that treatment
prevents disease for exactly one unit leads to M  yt +yc arrays of possible potential
outcomes.
Without a sharp hypothesis, we cannot know the randomization distribution of
all statistics. Additional information can make this hypothesis sharp: if the identity
of the protected unit is assumed to be known, then the remaining potential outcomes
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are known. This unknown information is a nuisance because it is a ﬁxed, unknown
value that is not of primary interest. It is also missing data because it is deﬁned in
terms of potential outcomes.
2.2.4 A General Dull Null Hypothesis
As our estimand of interest is ⌧,t e s t i n gan u l lh y p o t h e s i st h a ts p e c i ﬁ e s⌧ = ⌧0
seems natural. However, this hypothesis does not uniquely determine the contrast of
interest: Y (0)   Y (1), or equivalently, N10   N01. For example, FSN implies ⌧ =0 ,
but a hypothesis1 of ⌧ = 0 does not imply FSN, which is equivalent to setting both
N01 and N10 to zero. In the spirit of FSN, we specify a hypothesis of N01 = N01
0 and
N10 = N10
0 for N01
0 ,N10
0 2{ 0,...,N} and N01
0 + N10
0  N because together N01
0 and
N10
0 determine ⌧0.
As in the previous example, the hypothesis that N01 = N01
0 and N10 = N10
0
is not sharp in general. After observing the data, we know that the N01
0 units for
whom treatment protects against disease are composed of some combination of the
M   yt non-diseased treated units or the yc diseased control units. Also, the N10
0
units whom treatment harms (i.e., causes disease) are composed of some combination
of yt diseased treated units and N   M   yc non-diseased control units. A posteriori
there are
✓
M   yt + yc
N01
0
◆✓
yt + N   M   yc
N10
0
◆
(2.2)
possible arrays of potential outcomes. Again, without knowing all potential out-
comes, we cannot know the randomization distribution of all test statistics under our
1The hypothesis of ⌧ = 0 is often referred to as Neyman’s null hypothesis (Welch, 1937).
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hypothesis.
Henceforth, we call the hypothesis that N01 = N01
0 and N10 = N10
0 the dull null
because it is not sharp in general (and not because we think it boring!). Although the
true randomization distribution is unknown under the dull null, the interpretation of
Fisher’s randomization test as a PPC leads to a natural testing procedure.
2.3 Inference for a dull null hypothesis
2.3.1 PPCs as extension of Fisher’s randomization test
The dullness of the null hypothesis that N01 = N01
0 and N10 = N10
0 prevents us
from using the logic of Fisher’s randomization test. The analogy to PPC still applies
insofar as we only need to calculate ppp,a sd e ﬁ n e di ne q u a t i o n( 2 . 1 ) ,i no r d e rt oa s s e s s
the ﬁt of the dull null. Inverting PPCs of the dull null provides a plausible region for
the average causal e↵ect. The dullness only complicates calculations.
One calculation follows from “integrating out” the speciﬁc values of the potential
outcomes:
ppp =
X
Y2Y0
Pr
 
T(y
pp
obs,W
pp)   T(yobs,W) | yobs,W,Y
 
p
 
Y | yobs,W
 
(2.3)
where Y0 = {Y 2Y: N01 = N01
0 and N10 = N10
0 } is the set of arrays of potential
outcomes that satisfy the dull null hypothesis. Meng (1994) ﬁrst discussed the inter-
esting interpretation of PPCs as integrating out nuisance parameters via a two stage
procedure. In particular, the ﬁrst stage, corresponding to the ﬁrst term in the sum-
mation, calculates a signiﬁcance level under a sharp null hypothesis given all potential
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outcomes, Y. The second stage, corresponding to the second term in the summa-
tion, weights these tests of sharp nulls according to their posterior distribution. We
describe computations for these quantities in more detail.
Computing the ﬁrst stage
The ﬁrst stage calculation requires computing a signiﬁcance level for a sharp
hypothesis because the array of potential outcomes, Y,i sa s s u m e dk n o w n .T h es i g -
niﬁcance level can be calculate using distributional theory of the test statistic or
enumeration of all random assignment vectors, or it can be approximated via Monte
Carlo simulations of the random assignment vectors. Signiﬁcance levels must be cal-
culated for all possible arrays of potential outcomes, of which there are a potentially
very large number as demonstrate in Equation 2.2. We provide a deﬁnition of su -
ciently sharp partitions of the set of potential outcome arrays that alleviates the need
to consider every possible array of potential outcomes.
We call a partition, ⇧, of the set of all potential outcomes under a null hypothesis
su ciently sharp for statistic S,i ff o re v e r yP2⇧, Y 2Pand Y0 2Pimplies
Pr
 
S = s | Y
 
=P r
 
S = s | Y
0 
for all s in the support of the statistic. We use this terminology because knowing to
which set in the partition an array of potential outcomes belongs is “sharp enough” to
know the randomization distribution of the speciﬁed test statistic; we do not need to
know the speciﬁc array of potential outcomes. A su ciently sharp partition simpliﬁes
computation because we only need to calculate the ﬁrst stage signiﬁcance level for
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one array of potential outcomes in each set in the partition instead of considering all
possible arrays.
We provide a few examples of su ciently sharp partitions to illustrate how this
deﬁnition can be used under the dull null hypothesis. Trivially, the partition composed
of singleton sets of each element, ⌥s = {{Y} : Y 2Y 0},i ss u   c i e n t l ys h a r pf o ra l lt e s t
statistics. This partition is equivalent to considering all arrays of potential outcomes.
Ac o a r s e rp a r t i t i o ni sr e q u i r e dt os i m p l i f yc a l c u l a t i o n s .
Next consider a test statistic that is a function of the aggregated potential out-
comes, y. For example, the statistic yt, as is the case for Fisher’s randomization test,
or ˆ ⌧ =
yt
M  
yc
N M,a nu n b i a s e de s t i m a t eo ft h ea v e r a g et r e a t m e n te ↵ e c t .W ec a np a r -
tition the set of potential outcomes under the dull null hypothesis by the number of
doomed units, N11.T h a ti s ,l e tY0(N11
⇤ )={Y 2Y 0 : N11 = N11
⇤ },t h es e to fa r r a y so f
potential outcomes with aggregated potential outcomes N0⇤ =( N00
0⇤,N01
0 ,N10
0 ,N11
⇤ )
where N00
0⇤ = N  N01
0  N10
0  N11
⇤ and N11
⇤ 2{ 0,...,N N01
0  N10
0 }.T h ep a r t i t i o n
⌥0 = {Y0(0),Y0(1),...,Y0(N   N01
0   N10
0 )} is su ciently sharp for y.T h e p r o o f
follows from a simple representation of the distribution of y because if Y 2Y 0(N11
⇤ ),
then
yc = N
01
0   M
01 + N
11
⇤   M
11 (2.4)
yt = M
11 + M
10, (2.5)
which only depends on N0⇤ and M.T h er a n d o mv a r i a b l eM follows a multivariate
hypergeometric distribution with parameters (N0⇤,M )a n ds u p p o r tSN0⇤,s ot h e
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probability mass function of y is
p
 
y | Y
 
=
X
M2My|N0⇤
p
 
M | N
 
, (2.6)
where My|N0⇤ = {M 2S N0⇤ : yc = N01
0  M01+N11
⇤  M11 and yt = M11+M10}.T h e
distribution of y only depends on the array of potential outcomes, Y,t h r o u g ht h e
values of the aggregated potential outcomes, N,w h i c ha r et h es a m ef o ra l le l e m e n t s
of Y0(N11
⇤ ). Therefore, the partition ⌥0 is a su ciently sharp partition for y under
all dull null hypotheses. Using this su ciently sharp partition reduces the number of
ﬁrst stage signiﬁcance levels that need to be calculated to N  N10
0  N01
0 +1instead
of the number in (2.2). The partition is also su ciently sharp for any function of y.
Without any additional information, most test statistics in a completely random-
ized experiment will be a function of y.A t e s t s t a t i s t i c t h a t i s a f u n c t i o n o f t h e
ﬁrst K<Nunits is not a function of y (and ⌥0 is not su ciently sharp). If K is
arbitrarily chosen, this statistic is a little odd because it ignores some of the data.
However, if K is chosen to correspond to a pretreatment covariate, for example sex
of the unit, then it would be reasonable to consider such statistics. Su ciently sharp
partitions exist for statistics that are functions of covariates.
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Computing the second stage
The posterior of Y—the second term after the summation in equation (2.3)—is
proportional to the likelihood times the prior distribution:
p
 
Y | yobs,W
 
/ p
 
yobs,W | Y
 
p
 
Y
 
where all probabilities assume the dull null hypothesis. The likelihood is
p
 
yobs,W | Y
 
=p
 
yobs | W,Y
 
p
 
W
 
=
8
> > > <
> > > :
 N
M
  1
if yobs follows from W and Y,
0o t h e r w i s e ,
(2.7)
because yobs is a deterministic function of W and Y,a n dW is assigned using a
completely randomized design. The observed data restricts the set of possible arrays
of potential outcomes.
Choosing a prior distribution for the array of potential outcomes satisfying the dull
null hypothesis is tricky because it is di cult to conceptualize the space of all such
arrays. Instead, we prefer to place a prior distribution on an interpretable function of
the potential outcomes, which may be lower dimensional. We suggest placing a prior
distribution on the sets of a su ciently sharp partition for a test statistic, with all
elements within a set treated symmetrically. Although it seems strange to draw prior
information from the choice of test statistic, we believe the choice of test statistic
provides prior information in the form of possible violations of the hypothesis and
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symmetries on units.
We illustrate the di culties of choosing a prior distribution and our proposed
prior distribution under the dull null hypothesis and a test statistic that is a function
of y. First consider a “non-informative” uniform prior distribution on all arrays of
potential outcomes, that is p
 
Y
 
/ 1f o rY 2Y 0. This prior distribution induces
av e r yi n f o r m a t i v eb i n o m i a l ( N   N01
0   N10
0 ,1
2) prior distribution on the number of
doomed units, N11.T h eq u a n t i t yN11 is more interpretable than a speciﬁc array of
potential outcomes and corresponds to a unique set in the su ciently sharp partition
for y. We propose placing a prior distribution on the event {Y 2Y 0(N11
⇤ )} and equal
probabilities to each element within that set (i.e., p
 
Y
 
=p
 
Y0 
if Y 2Y 0(N11
⇤ )a n d
Y0 2Y 0(N11
⇤ )). This prior distribution reduces to placing a prior distribution on N11.
We recommend a uniform distribution over all plausible values of N11.
Computing ppp
Considering the su ciently sharp partition in both the ﬁrst and second stage
computation simpliﬁes the calculation and interpretation of the posterior predictive
p-value. Using a test statistic that is a function of y and a prior distribution on the
su ciently sharp partition ⌥0,w ec a ns h o w
Pr
 
T(y
pp)   T(y) | yobs,W
 
=P r
 
T(y
pp)   T(y) | y
 
, (2.8)
using a counting argument (details in Appendix B).
The su ciently sharp partition is inversely related to the idea of data reduction via
su cient statistics. In the latter case, a parametric model induces a su cient statistic
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that “contains the whole of the information about the parameter”. The su ciently
sharp partition applies for a statistic ﬁrst and then partitions the space of arrays of
potential outcomes—or “parameters”—into sets that contain all the information for
the test statistic.
The extension of Fisher’s randomization test to PPCs maintains the logic of using
randomization as the inferential tool and allows us to assess the ﬁt of a dull null
hypothesis. Lack of ﬁt can be attributed to violations of the dull null hypothesis,
the likelihood, or the prior distribution. We view the likelihood as assumption free
because it is derived from the randomization of a ﬁnite population. If the PPCs are
not too sensitive to the prior distribution (we examine prior sensitivity in Section
2.4.2), inverting PPCs for di↵erent values of N01
0 and N10
0 leads to a plausible region
for the average causal e↵ect.
2.3.2 Other methods of handling nuisances
Several methods have been proposed for the well known problem of nuisance
parameters (see Basu, 1977). We cover some approaches here, but do not provide an
exhaustive review.
Instead of averaging over a set of arrays of potential outcomes, we could maximize
over this set. Deﬁne the p-value as the largest signiﬁcance level when considering all
possible values of the nuisance (Casella and Berger, 2001, p. 397). That is,
pmax =m a x
Y2Y0
PrY
 
T(y
rep
obs,W
rep)   T(yobs,W)
 
,
where the probability refers to repeated randomizations for a ﬁxed potential outcome
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array. The p-value guarantees the type 1 error rate is no larger than a prescribed
level but is often criticized for being too conservative because it considers values of
the nuisance that are not relevant to the observed data.
To alleviate the cautiousness of the p-value, the plug-in method assumes the nui-
sance parameter is ﬁxed at an estimate. As discussed in the previous section, there
is no evidence for or against any speciﬁc array of potential outcomes, so estimating a
speciﬁc value of the nuisance is di cult. However, the value N11 can be estimated,
so a possible plug-in procedure might maximize over all potential outcomes with N11
ﬁxed at an estimate b N11,t h a ti s
pplug =m a x
Y2Y0( b N11)
PrY
 
T(y
rep
obs,W
rep)   T(yobs,W)
 
.
Plug-in methods test sets of potential outcomes that are more relevant to the observed
data, but they do not account for the uncertainty of the estimate of the nuisance.
Perhaps the most appealing solution to handling nuisances is to account for the
additional uncertainty in the reference distribution of a test statistic using a pivot
(e.g., Student’s t-test and Pearson’s  2 test of independence). We have not been
able to ﬁnd such a test statistic and its corresponding reference distribution for this
problem.
No discussion of interval estimation for average causal e↵ects would be complete
without considering Jerzy Neyman’s important contributions (Neyman et al., 1990;
Neyman, 1934). Neyman’s approach can be summarized as follows (Imbens and
Rubin, 2014, chapter 6): ﬁrst ﬁnd an unbiased estimator of the estimand, calculate
the variance of the estimator under repeated randomizations, ﬁnd an unbiased or
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positively biased estimator of the variance, and appeal to ﬁnite population central
limit theorem to get conﬁdence interval estimates. Neyman et al. (1990) showed the
variance of the unbiased estimator ˆ ⌧ cannot be unbiasedly estimated. A positively
biased estimator corresponds to (but does not require) an assumption of constant
additive treatment e↵ects.
Models of binary outcomes can provide useful interval estimates of ﬁnite popula-
tion estimands. The common conﬁdence interval for the di↵erence of two proportions
is procedurally similar to Neyman’s approach, but assumes a super population bi-
nomial model on the aggregated observed outcomes. Exact inference for the same
super population model avoids nuisance parameters by changing the estimand of in-
terest to the odds ratio (Cox and Snell, 1989, Section 2.3). The phenomenological
Bayesian approach directly imputes missing potential outcomes with a model and
provides interval estimates from the posterior distribution of the estimand (Rubin,
1978a,b). With the exception of phenomenological Bayes, model-based approaches
do not explicitly discuss the role of randomization.
2.4 Examples with 42 units
We illustrate our procedure on some toy examples for completely randomized
experiments, in particular when N = 42. First we demonstrate an analysis of a
real dataset and then consider repeated sampling properties of PPCs. We focus on
non-asymptotic approaches and exact calculations for such a small sample size.
50Chapter 2: Randomization-based intervals for binary outcomes
2.4.1 One real toy dataset
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Figure 2.1: Signiﬁcance levels for all possible dull null hypotheses for the Freireich
dataset. Light blue contours highlight values of ⌧.T h en o n - g r e ya r e ac o r r e s p o n d st o
inverting ppp at the ↵ =0 .05 level. The region highlighted in green dashes corresponds
to the assumption of monotonicity.
We illustrate our approach with an analysis of data from a clinical trial of palliative
therapy for acute leukemia from Freireich et al. (1963). Gehan (1965) and later Cox
(1972) canonized this dataset with demonstrations of survival analysis with right
censoring. Because we are concerned with binary outcomes, we consider the outcome
as either in remission (i.e., non-diseased) or not in remission (i.e., diseased) at six
weeks from the start of remission. The cuto↵ at six weeks is made to obviate the
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problem of right censoring—remission status at six weeks is observed for all units.
We assume a completely randomized design was used when in fact the trial used a
paired and sequential design.
This study involved N = 42 units who recently went into remission. Half of the
units were assigned treatment (M = 21) and half were assigned placebo. After six
weeks, yt =3u n i t se n d e dr e m i s s i o ni nt h et r e a t e dg r o u pa n dyc =9u n i t se n d e d
remission in the control group.
We invert PPCs of the dull null hypothesis to get a plausible region for the av-
erage causal e↵ect. For a test statistic, we use the di↵erence of the sample means:
T(yobs,W)=ˆ ⌧.B o t h l a r g e a n d s m a l l v a l u e s o f t h i s s t a t i s t i c a r e e x t r e m e , s o w e
consider signiﬁcance levels of the form 2 · min(pl
pp,p g
pp), where
p
l
pp =P r
 
T(y
pp
obs,W
pp)  T(yobs,W) | yobs,W
 
p
g
pp =P r
 
T(y
pp
obs,W
pp)   T(yobs,W) | yobs,W
 
.
We place a uniform prior distribution on the sets of ⌥0,as u   c i e n t l ys h a r pp a r t i t i o n
for ˆ ⌧.
For these data, the range of plausible values for N01 is 0 to 27 and for N10 is 0
to 15. We calculate ppp for every dull null hypothesis comprised of a combination
of these two values. The results are plotted in Figure 2.1, in which non-grey areas
correspond to plausible dull null hypotheses at the 0.05 level. From this ﬁgure, it is
clear that no one dimensional interval can summarize the plausible region for ⌧.T h e
widest possible interval for ⌧ corresponds to (-0.48, 0).
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2.4.2 All possible toy datasets
So far, we have refrained from describing intervals from inverted PPCs as having a
speciﬁed conﬁdence level. Such discretion is required because PPCs do not generally
maintain type 1 error (Rubin et al., 1984; Meng, 1994; Gelman et al., 1996; Bayarri
and Berger, 2000; Robins et al., 2000), and thus intervals from inverted PPCs will not
guarantee a nominal coverage. In order to assess the repeated sampling properties of
these intervals, we calculate the type 1 error rate of these tests, which corresponds to
one minus the coverage.
We focus on all possible aggregated potential outcomes. Results for speciﬁc arrays
of potential outcomes follows by symmetry. For N = 42, the set of all aggregated
potential outcomes is {N 2 N4 : N00 +N01 +N10 +N11 =4 2 },w h i c hc o r r e s p o n d st o
a 3-simplex over integer values. Figure 2.2 illustrates this set, which contains 14,190
elements. We examine two cases. First, we assess the ﬁt of the model which assumes
the dull null hypothesis. Then we consider one overall test for a speciﬁed value of the
average causal e↵ect.
Testing the true dull null
For all possible aggregated potential outcomes, we evaluate the type 1 error rate
when the dull null is true. That is, for Y0 with aggregated potential outcomes N =
(N00
0 ,N01
0 ,N10
0 ,N11
0 ), we calculate
Type 1 Error Rate = PrY0
 
p  ↵
 
, (2.9)
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N01
N10
N11
N00=N-N01-N10-N11
0 7 14 42
Figure 2.2: Graphical representation of the set of all aggregated potential outcomes for
N =4 2 .T h ep l a n eh i g h l i g h t e di ng r e e nd a s h e si st h es u b s e to fa g g r e g a t e dp o t e n t i a l
outcomes where monotonicity holds. The planes highlighted in red dashes are subsets
in which ⌧ equals 0, -1/6, and -1/3 from left to right respectively.
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where p is a signiﬁcance level of a test that assumes the true dull null hypothesis
of N01 = N01
0 and N10 = N10
0 (and ignores N11
0 and N00
0 )a n dt h ep r o b a b i l i t yi s
taken over randomizations under the true array of potential outcomes. We use the
same test statistic, signiﬁcance level, and prior distribution as the previous section.
The number of treated units is varied: M =2 1 ,2 8 ,3 2 ,a n d3 5c o r r e s p o n d i n gt o
allocations of treatment to control of 1:1, 2:1, 3:1, and 5:1 respectively. We examine
type 1 error rates for ↵ =0 .05. For comparison, we calculate type 1 error rates
for the plug-in method for two estimators of N11: pplug(MAP) plugs in the maximum
a posteriori (MAP) estimator and pplug(MoM) plugs in a method of moments (MoM)
estimator2.
Table 2.2: Summaries of type 1 error rates for testing the true dull null hypothesis.
All possible aggregated potential outcomes are considered for N =4 2 .
Procedure M =2 1 M =2 8 M =3 2 M =3 5
Proportion with type 1 error > 0.05
ppp 0.005 0.001 0.029 0.038
pplug(MAP) 0 < 0.001 0.003 0.005
pplug(MoM) 0.043 0.021 0.143 0.071
Maximum type 1 error
ppp 0.052 0.052 0.059 0.061
pplug(MAP) 0.05 0.052 0.058 0.065
pplug(MoM) 0.114 0.08 0.141 0.153
Summaries of type 1 error rates are presented in Table 2.2. We summarize the
results for M =2 1 .F o rP P C ,0 . 5 %o f1 4 , 1 9 0a g g r e g a t e dp o t e n t i a lo u t c o m e sh a v ea
type one error greater than the nominal 0.05 level. The largest type 1 error rate is
0.052. The plug-in method works well when using the MAP estimator of the nuisance
2We round the unbiased MoM estimator, b N11
MoM = N
Myt   N01
0 , to the nearest plausible integer.
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Figure 2.3: Type 1 error rates for ppp, pplug(MAP),a n dpplug(MoM) (from top to bottom
respectively) for aggregated potential outcomes when N =4 2 ,M =2 1 ,a n d⌧=0,
-1/6, and -1/3 (from left to right respectively).
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parameter, but not as well with the naive MoM estimator. For the plug-in method
using the MoM estimator, 4.3% of all aggregated potential outcomes have type 1 error
greater than 0.05 (with a largest rate of 0.114), whereas using the MAP has no type
1 error rates greater than 0.05. As M gets closer to N,t h ep r o c e d u r e sp e r f o r ml e s s
well, but even the maximum type 1 error rates for ppp and pplug(MAP) are still close
to the nominal level. Type 1 error rates for M = 21 are plotted in Figure 2.3 for
aggregated potential outcomes with ⌧ = 0, -1/6, and -1/3. The triangles from Figure
2.3 correspond to the dashed red triangles in Figure 2.2.
The only di↵erence between the assumptions underlying the PPCs and the true
set of potential outcomes is our prior distribution on the potential outcomes. The
repeated sampling properties of the PPCs are not too sensitive to our choice of prior
because the type 1 error rates are near the nominal level. Therefore, small signiﬁcance
levels can be attributed to either a lack of ﬁt of the dull null hypothesis or a rare
event occurring.
A single test for the true average causal e↵ect
Enumerating tests over all possible values of N01 and N10 can be tedious. To
alleviate this arduous task, for a speciﬁc value of the average causal e↵ect we propose
using one hypothesis that assumes monotonicity on the potential outcomes.
Assumption 2 Monotonicity: The treatment cannot harm units. That is, Yi(0)  
Yi(1) for all i =1 ,...,N.
For a speciﬁc ⌧0  0, this procedure tests the dull null N01 =  N⌧0 and N10 =0 .
Of course, the monotonicity assumption can also assume treatment cannot protect
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units, which corresponds to a nonnegative average causal e↵ect.
We evaluate type one error properties of this procedure for tests that assume
the true average causal e↵ect. That is, for Y0 with aggregated potential outcomes
N =( N00
0 ,N01
0 ,N10
0 ,N11
0 ), we calculate the probability in equation (2.9), but now p
is the signiﬁcance level from a test that assumes the dull null of N01 = N01
0   N10
0
and N10 =0 .T y p e1e r r o rr a t e su s i n gt h i st e s t i n gp r o c e d u r ea r ep r e s e n t e di nT a b l e
2.3. This procedure is valid for almost all arrays of potential outcomes, even when
monotonicity does not hold. By valid, we mean the type one error rate is at most the
nominal level.
Table 2.3: Summaries of type 1 error rates for testing N01 = N⌧0 and N10 = 0. All
possible aggregated potential outcomes are considered for N =4 2 .
Procedure M =2 1 M =2 8 M =3 2 M =3 5
Proportion with type 1 error > 0.05
ppp 0 < 0.001 0.002 0.001
pplug(MAP) 0 0 0.001 < 0.001
pplug(MoM) 0.007 0.003 0.036 0.003
Maximum type 1 error
ppp 0.05 0.051 0.056 0.058
pplug(MAP) 0.05 0.049 0.054 0.052
pplug(MoM) 0.114 0.072 0.087 0.068
This procedure being valid is not surprising. In Section 2.4.1, the widest plausible
interval for ⌧ corresponds to tests under the assumption of monotonicity (see the re-
gion highlighted in green in Figure 2.1). Furthermore, the monotonicity assumption
is analogous to (and weaker than) the assumption of constant additive treatment ef-
fects for continuous outcomes. The latter assumption corresponds to valid conﬁdence
intervals from Neyman’s perspective, even when additivity does not hold.
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We have shown for the case of N =4 2t h a ti n v e r t i n gh y p o t h e s i st e s t su s i n g
PPCs or the plug-in method using the MAP estimator will give conﬁdence intervals
with approximate nominal coverage. Although rigorous theory would be ideal, our
exhaustive study for a typical value of N shows our procedure generally provides valid
conﬁdence intervals.
2.5 Discussion
Although we have focused on the simple case of a completely randomized experi-
ment with the estimand of average causal e↵ects, using PPCs to test non-sharp nulls of
causal e↵ects applies generally for estimands involving binary outcomes. The general
approach deﬁnes a hypothesis for a speciﬁc estimand of interest. The PPC averages
sharp hypothesis tests for every array of potential outcomes satisfying the dull null
hypothesis with respect to the posterior distribution. The posterior distribution is
proportional to a prior distribution on the potential outcomes times an assumption
free likelihood that is induced by randomization.
With this general framework, we can address other experimental designs. Ex-
tending inference to randomized block and paired designs is simple. Another ran-
domization scheme to consider is the group sequential design used by data and safety
monitoring boards (Pocock, 1977; O’Brien and Fleming, 1979).
In addition to more designs, we can address other causal estimands of interest.
Although unit-level relative risks (and odds ratios) are ill-deﬁned, we can consider
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the following ﬁnite population relative risk:
⌧rr =
P
i Yi(0)
P
i Yi(1)
.
Other estimands might pertain to a speciﬁc subset of units as is the case when esti-
mands are deﬁned with respect to a principal stratum (Frangakis and Rubin, 2002).
Examples of such estimands are the complier average causal e↵ect, which arises when
units do not perfectly comply with the assigned treatment (Sommer and Zeger, 1991;
Angrist et al., 1996); the survivor average causal e↵ect, which arises when outcomes
are “censored by death” (Rubin, 2006; Zhang and Rubin, 2003); and the e↵ect of vac-
cine on disease severity, which is only well-deﬁned for the doomed principal stratum
(Hudgens and Halloran, 2006).
One limitation to this approach is that it may be di cult to incorporate con-
tinuous covariates or outcomes because any one value will not have enough units to
create a group. However, discretizing continuous values can o↵er robustness to model
assumptions (Cangul et al., 2009). Moreover, computation of PPCs is more inten-
sive than standard asymptotic approximations or super population methods. Lastly,
placing a prior distribution on the array of potential outcomes is di cult. Using
su ciently sharp partitions for a given test statistic can both simplify computation
and motivate possible prior distributions.
Our focus on a ﬁnite population may also seem a limitation because any exper-
iment has the goal of generalizing to some larger population. Although such trans-
portability of results is important, we view our inference as derived from only the
physical randomization controlled by the experimenter. Without a clearly deﬁned
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super population and a random sampling scheme of that population, assumptions
about the representativeness of the experimental units must be made. We eschew
such assumptions here and opt for principled analysis of the ﬁnite population.
These complications do not arise from trying to make a simple problem more
di cult, but rather originate from the reasonable approach of considering a ﬁnite
population and physical randomization as our inferential tool. Interpreting Fisher’s
randomization test as PPCs leads to a natural test that integrates out nuisance un-
knowns. By inverting these hypothesis tests, we create approximate conﬁdence inter-
vals for estimands involving binary outcomes.
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Exposure e cacy and interference
in prophylactic treatments of HIV
3.1 Introduction
A treatment that reduces susceptibility to HIV transmission could have a massive
impact on the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Development of an e↵ective vaccine for HIV has
been elusive (Walker and Burton, 2008; Hammer et al., 2013; Buchbinder et al., 2008).
In lieu of a vaccine, a dose of antiretroviral agents has been proposed as a pre-exposure
prophylactic (PrEP) treatment that would be used by uninfected persons before (or
soon after) sexual intercourse with potentially HIV infected partners (Cohen and
Baden, 2012). Some clinical trials have provided evidence for PrEP treatments ef-
fectively preventing HIV infections (Thigpen et al., 2012; Karim et al., 2010; Grant
et al., 2010; Baeten et al., 2012), but other trials have been stopped early because
e↵ectiveness could not be established (Cohen and Baden, 2012; Van Damme et al.,
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2012). Further research is needed to examine the potential e↵ects of PrEP treatments
as well as new vaccines. We discuss the di culties in assessing the e↵ect of a pro-
phylactic treatment of HIV from the perspective of the Rubin Causal Model (RCM,
Holland, 1986), which extends the causal model of Neyman et al. (1990) beyond com-
pletely randomized experiments. Assessing e cacy of prophylactic treatments of HIV
ﬁts into the more general framework of assessing e cacy of a preventative treatment
of an infectious disease (for a full length text on the subject, see Halloran et al., 2010).
We focus on two issues in such studies: exposure to disease and interference between
units.
The ﬁrst issue is concerned with whether or not a person is exposed to the disease.
Being exposed to the disease is of obvious importance for assessing the e cacy of the
disease. Exposure occurs after treatment is assigned, and thus it is a well deﬁned
outcome. Di↵erences of exposure under di↵erent treatments imply an e↵ect of as-
signment to treatment on exposure. The potential for such e↵ects on exposure are
well known and precautions are taken to ensure some intuitive notion of comparable
exposure under both treatments. Our contribution follows the RCM by conceptualiz-
ing the potential outcomes of exposure for a given subject under both the assignment
to the experimental and control treatment as well as the treatment assignment to the
entire population. With the additional notation for exposure, we show that identical
exposure cannot occur in general for an e↵ective treatment.
The second issue with trials of infectious disease is that the treatment of one
unit can interfere with the outcome of infection for another unit. We link the ideas
of exposure to an infectious disease and interference between units: a prophylactic
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treatment has the potential to prevent disease for some people and thus prevents
these people from exposing others to the disease. The reason for interference for the
outcome of infection is due to interference on the amount of exposure for another unit.
Hudgens and Halloran (HH, 2008) describe the general problem of inference between
units using the RCM to deﬁne estimands that describe the direct, indirect, total,
and overall e↵ects of the treatment with respect to di↵erent intervention programs.
The indirect e↵ect of HH can be interpreted as the quantifying interference in the
randomized experiment. Our contribution is a simple threshold model for disease
transmission that considers the number of exposures before infection. The threshold
model can be related to the probabilistic binomial model for disease transmission,
but has the advantage of producing ﬁxed outcomes for each combination of treatment
assignments, even in the presence of interference. Fixed outcomes is a requirement for
the estimands within the RCM. We perform a simulation study of a population and
quantify the amount of interference in a simulated population using the estimands of
HH.
We focus on the case study of a prophylactic treatment of HIV as a motivating
example because the two issues of exposure and interference have physical inter-
pretations. Exposure to HIV can be well deﬁned as a distinct event occurring in
continuous time. In particular, we consider exposure to HIV for an uninfected unit
as unprotected sexual intercourse with an HIV infected unit. The clear description
of exposure also allows us to consider how units can potentially interfere with each
other. In particular, interference between units can be described via a network of
sexual partners.
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In the next section, we provide intuition behind the complications that arise in
trials for preventive treatments of infectious disease. Section 3.3 describes general
potential outcomes notation with which we can deﬁne more clearly the post-treatment
outcome of exposure. Section 3.4 describes a simple example of a couples study
design in which the complications of interference are avoided in order to focus on the
speciﬁc issue of exposure. Section 3.5 describes another more general example of a
closed population design in which interference does occur. We introduce the threshold
model and demonstrate with a simulation study how the concepts of exposure and
interference are related.
3.2 Challenges
The challenges of causal inference of infectious diseases have been addressed in
many settings. We introduce some of the conceptual challenges that arise with ex-
amples and address how we approach these issues for a trial of the e cacy of a pro-
phylactic treatment of HIV. More formal deﬁnitions and examples using the notation
of the RCM will be considered in later sections.
3.2.1 Deﬁning Exposure
For any given infectious disease, “being exposed” to the disease can be hard to
deﬁne. Consider inﬂuenza as an example. What does it mean to be in contact with,
or exposed to the ﬂu? Does one need to be in close contact with an infected person?
Or is everyone in a room exposed if there is one infected person in the room?
We follow Rhodes et al. (1996) and deﬁne an exposure for a susceptible person as
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at y p eo fc o n t a c tw i t ha n o t h e rp e r s o n( o rp e r s o n s )w h oi s( o ra r e )i n f e c t i o u s .M o r e
speciﬁcally, a susceptible person is someone who can potentially contract the disease
(i.e., not already infected) and an infectious person is someone who can potentially
infect another person. A contact is some interaction in which the disease could be
transmitted between the infectious person and susceptible person. Di↵erent contacts
necessarily deﬁne di↵erent types of exposures.
For example, Longini et al. (1988) di↵erentiate two types of exposures: within a
household and within a community. For household exposure, contact is deﬁned by
living in close proximity to another person in a household. An household is infectious
if one person in the household is infectious; that is all of the other members of that
household are considered exposed if one person in the household is infectious. In
contrast, community exposure represents a person’s everyday interaction within a
community. Everyone in the same community receives the same amount of exposure
at the community level, so the community is always infectious.
Deﬁnitions of exposure to HIV are more clear. HIV is primarily transmitted
through unprotected sexual intercourse or sharing intravenous needles, thus the con-
tacts can be deﬁned as unprotected sex or sharing needles. Other types of contacts
can be deﬁned or further distinguished (e.g., vaginal sex, oral sex, etc.). Furthermore,
an HIV infected person is infectious.
For this discussion, we consider one deﬁnition of exposure to HIV as unprotected
sex with an HIV infected individual. We focus on a population of men who have sex
with men, which is a common target population for trials of PrEP treatments. Each
contact is composed of two individuals in the population and a unique time at which
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the sexual encounter occurred. Additionally, we assume that all HIV infected persons
are infectious and that if infection occurs for a susceptible unit, it occurs at a distinct
exposure. These notions are made more concrete in Section 3.3.1.
3.2.2 Documenting Exposure
Even if exposure can be well deﬁned for a given contact, actually documenting
whether or not a person is exposed is not trivial. In the example of household exposure
from Longini et al. (1988), if contact is deﬁned as living in the same household as
an infected person, then we must document both household membership and the
infectiousness of every member of the household. For a given unit, both the data on
contacts and infection status of contacted persons must be documented in order to
assess exposure.
For HIV, this information amounts to knowing the number of sex acts a unit
participates in and whether or not the unit’s sexual partners are HIV infected. A unit
will most likely know the former information, but often not the latter. Furthermore,
collecting information on the HIV status of sexual partners for every unit in the
study would be expensive and unreasonable. We proceed under the assumption that
information on the number of sex acts can be documented (i.e., the contact process),
but the infection status of sexual partners cannot be directly documented.
Whether or not an exposure can be documented is a practical concern, in par-
ticular for estimation of causal e↵ects. Rhodes et al. (1996) discuss di↵erent models
that condition on exposure information, which we interpret as documenting exposure
information under the assigned treatment. In contrast, we focus on the description of
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exposure under di↵erent treatment assignments and possible di↵erences across treat-
ment assignments.
3.2.3 Identical Exposure
We are focused on treatments that attempt to reduce susceptibility to a disease,
that is the treatment attempts to reduce the chance of contracting the disease when
exposed. In such situations, the identical exposure condition assumes every subject is
exposed equally to the disease under assignment to the active and control treatments.
The identical exposure condition ensures that the comparison of subjects assigned to
treatment and subjects assigned to control have the same amount of exposure (on
average). Di↵erences in exposure across treatment groups could imply a di↵erent
mechanism for reducing infections than the desired e↵ect on susceptibility. We return
to this concept in more detail in Section 3.4.2.
Historically, Greenwood and Yule (1915) ﬁrst described the identical exposure
condition, and we brieﬂy contrast this condition to another requirement of Green-
wood and Yule (1915): “[t]he persons must be, in all material respects,a l i k e . ” W e
interpret the distinction between these two conditions on pre-treatment covariates
and post-treatment variables (i.e., exposure). The examples provided in Greenwood
and Yule (1915) suggest the distinction is made for practical reasons stemming from
observational studies (e.g., comparing inoculated units to uninoculated units across
di↵erent years) instead of distinguishing between pre-treatment and post-treatment
quantities in a randomized experiment, which had not been formally deﬁned at the
time. Regardless of the intentions of Greenwood and Yule (1915), the notion of iden-
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tical exposure is a valid request in a clinical trial of a prophylactic treatment. Next,
we discuss some violations of identical exposure.
3.2.4 E↵ects on Exposure
Exposure occurs after treatment has been assigned and thus may be a↵ected by
the treatment. Exposure e↵ects are a violation of the identical exposure condition,
and it is important to consider possible e↵ects—both intended and unintended—of
the treatment on exposure. Indeed, many interventions for infectious diseases directly
target reducing the number of exposures. For example, personalized counseling for
adolescents has been shown to reduce high-risk sexual behaviors, or contacts (Kamb
et al., 1998). The identical exposure condition is required for treatments that reduce
susceptibility and thus do not directly target reductions in exposure. Halloran et al.
(1994) introduce this notion of exposure e cacy and describe possible biases that
can arise in simple models of disease transmission when the treatment a↵ects expo-
sure. We consider possible explanations for treatment e↵ects on exposure, but do not
address these issues in more detail.
One concern for developing an e↵ective HIV prophylactic is the potential for risk
compensation, or the increase of risky behavior because of a presumed decrease in
susceptibility (Cassell et al., 2006). That is, a person may engage in more risky
sexual practices if he or she knows they are taking a potentially e↵ective prophylactic
treatment. Using placebos and blinding subjects to the treatment attempt to protect
against such e↵ects as well as additional counseling for HIV prevention regardless of
as u b j e c t s ’t r e a t m e n ta s s i g n m e n t .G u e s te ta l .( 2 0 0 8 )p r e s e n tr e s u l t so np o s s i b l er i s k
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compensation in a PrEP trial.
Am o r es u b t l ee ↵ e c to ft r e a t m e n to ne x p o s u r em a yb ed u et os i d ee ↵ e c t sc a u s e db y
the active treatment. If the treatment causes a side e↵ect that leads to a change in a
person’s sexual activity, then the treatment might (inadvertently) cause a decrease in
exposure to the disease. For example, Karim et al. (2010) showed a PrEP treatment
might cause diarrhea in some subjects, who may have changed their sexual behavior
as a result.
There are several potential e↵ects of the treatment on exposure. The above ex-
amples explain possible treatment e↵ects on units’ sexual behavior and thus the way
that units contact each other. In contrast, we now consider an e↵ect on exposure
that changes the infectiousness of partners.
3.2.5 Interference between units
Interference between units in a trial of a prophylactic treatment of HIV can be
attributed to an e↵ect on exposure. If the treatment prevents one unit from contract-
ing HIV, then treatment is also preventing that unit from exposing additional people
in the population. The treatment reduces exposures by reducing the number of infec-
tious people in the population. An important point about interference between units
in studies of infectious disease is that it can be attributed to an e↵ect on exposure.
For a trial of a prophylactic for HIV, units expose each other to HIV via sexual
contacts. Furthermore, by considering contacts as events occurring at speciﬁc times
between two units, we can conceive of exposure to HIV occurring within a network
of sexual contacts. Many studies have examined sexual networks and its relation to
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sexually transmitted diseases (Jones and Handcock, 2003; Helleringer and Kohler,
2007). Additional work has considered the spread of epidemics through networks
(Newman, 2002; Ganesh et al., 2005; Kenah and Robins, 2007; Volz and Meyers,
2009). We distinguish our contribution as examining the network of sexual contacts
as creating interference in a trial of prophylactic treatment for HIV.
In Section 3.3, we follow prior work on the RCM in the presence of interference. In
particular, Sobel (2006) considered estimands and estimation in situations that vio-
late the common no interference assumption (a.k.a., part of the stable unit treatment
value assumption, Rubin, 1980). HH generalized some of the ideas of Sobel (2006)
and deﬁned estimands describing the direct, indirect, total, and overall e↵ects of the
treatment. We describe these estimands in more detail in Section 3.5.1. Rosenbaum
(2007) o↵ered a di↵erent inferential goal by describing the e↵ect attributable to in-
terference. Our work extends ideas introduced in Halloran and Struchiner (1995),
which also considers the role of exposure in interference, by describing how indirect
e↵ects on exposure result in indirect e↵ects on infections. This connection is made
through the threshold model, introduced in Section 3.5.2, and demonstrated with a
simulation in Section 3.5.3.
3.3 Neyman-Rubin Causal Model
We make this discussion more concrete by developing notation of the RCM for a
simple example of an experiment that tests the e↵ect of a prophylactic treatment of
HIV. The RCM conceptualizes the “potential outcomes” under all possible treatments
for each unit. We consider a trial that begins and ends at a ﬁxed time.
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3.3.1 Potential outcomes
We consider a ﬁnite population of N units. The population is divided into an ex-
perimental population and non-experimental population. The experimental popula-
tion consists of n  N units to whom the experimenter assigns either an experimental
treatment or control treatment. The experimental population is a ﬁxed subset of the
population, that is, we do not consider how the experimental population is sampled
(random or otherwise) from the ﬁnite population. Generalizing the results of the ex-
perimental population to a new population relies on assumptions of how “comparable”
the new population is to the experimental population. The non-experimental popula-
tion is composed of all units who potentially come into contact with the experimental
population for the duration of the trial. The distinction between the non-experimental
and experimental populations is necessary because units in the experimental popula-
tion can interact with units outside the experimental population and the outcomes of
the experimental population may depend on the outcomes of the non-experimental
population. For convenience, we index the experimental population with i =1 ,...,n
and the remaining non-experimental population with i = n +1 ,...,N.
Each unit in the experimental population receives one of two possible treatments.
Let Zi denote the treatment that unit i =1 ,...,n receives where 1 corresponds to
the active treatment and 0 corresponds to the control treatment. Units in the non-
experimental population cannot receive either treatment and thus we let Zi = ⇤ for
i = n +1 ,...,N.W el e tZ =( Z1,...,Z N)b et h et r e a t m e n ta s s i g n m e n tv e c t o r .L e t
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ZN
n be the set of possible assignment vectors for n  N,t h a ti s ,
Z
N
n = {(z1,...,z N):zi 2{ 0,1} for i =1 ,...,nand zi = ⇤ for i = n +1 ,...,N}.
For example, Z4
2 = {(0,0,⇤,⇤),(0,1,⇤,⇤),(1,0,⇤,⇤),(1,1,⇤,⇤)}.
The primary outcome of interest is whether or not a unit contracts HIV. Let Y t
i (z)
be the HIV infection status of unit i =1 ,...,N at time t 2 [0,T]u n d e rt r e a t m e n t
assignment vector z 2Z N
n .T h e t i m e t =0c o r r e s p o n d st ot h eb e g i n n i n go ft h e
experiment (for all units) and T is a ﬁxed point in time denoting the end of the
experiment.
In addition to the primary outcome, sexual contacts occur after treatment is
assigned and are a well deﬁned outcome. Let Ct
i,i0(z)b et h et o t a ln u m b e ro fu n -
protected sexual contacts between units i =1 ,...,N and i0 =1 ,...,N up un-
til time t 2 [0,T] under treatment assignment vector z 2Z N
n .W e t r e a t c o n t a c t s
symmetrically—Ct
i,i0(z)=Ct
i0,i(z)—but the notation is general enough to allow con-
tacts to be deﬁned asymmetrically (e.g., deﬁning contact “directionally” as unit i
contacts unit i0). By convention, deﬁne C0
i,i0(z)=0a n dCt
i,i(z) = 0 for all possible i,
i0, t,a n dz.T h ec o n t a c tp r o c e s sCt
i,i0(z)i sas t e pf u n c t i o nw i t hr e s p e c tt ot that in-
crements by one at the time of each contact. We deﬁne Ct
i,i0(z)t ob er i g h tc o n t i n u o u s
with left limits and assume no two contacts occur at exactly the same time.
With deﬁnitions of infection and a contact process, we can deﬁne exposure between
susceptible unit i and infectious unit i0 6= i with respect to the infection status of two
units and the contact process. At time t and under treatment assignment z,u n i ti is
exposed by unit i0 if unit i is susceptible immediately before time t,u n i ti0 is infected
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at the time t (and thus infectious), and units i and i0 have unprotected sex at time t;
that is lims"t Y s
i (z)=0 ,Y t
i0(z)=1 ,a n dCt
i,i0(z)=l i m s"t Cs
ij(z) + 1. If unit i0 infects
unit i with exposure at time t,t h e nY t
i (z)=1 .
With the deﬁnition of a single exposure, we can count the number of times unit i
is exposed by unit i0.L e tDt
i,i0(z)b et h en u m b e ro ft i m e su n i ti0 exposes unit i from
time 0 to t under treatment assignment z.T h i sd e ﬁ n i t i o ni sn o ts y m m e t r i ci nt h a t
unit i0 exposing unit i is not the same as unit i exposing unit i0.W e c a n r e p r e s e n t
this quantity as
D
t
i,i0(z)=C
u
i,i0(z)   lim
s"l
C
s
i,i0(z)
where
u =s u p {s 2 [0,t]:Y
s
i (z)=0a n dY
s
i0(z)=1 }
l =i n f {s 2 [0,t]:Y
s
i (z)=0a n dY
s
i0(z)=1 }
and the notation for u and l suppress the obvious dependence on i, i0, t,a n dz for
simplicity. Lastly, we let Dt
i(z)b et h et o t a ln u m b e ro fe x p o s u r e sf o ru n i ti up to time
t under treatment assignment z,t h a ti s
D
t
i(z)=
N X
i0=1
D
t
i,i0(z).
With the potential outcomes notation, causal e↵ects are comparisons of the poten-
tial outcomes under the two di↵erent treatment assignment vectors. We deﬁne causal
estimands more precisely in the next two sections under two di↵erent scenarios. In
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Section 3.4, we consider a monogamous couples design, which avoids the complica-
tions of interference by design. We consider interference in Section 3.5 which discusses
ac l o s e dp o p u l a t i o nd e s i g ni nw h i c ha l lu n i t sc a ni n t e r a c tw i t he a c ho t h e r .
3.4 Couples design
Ac o u p l e sd e s i g ne n r o l l su n i n f e c t e du n i t sw h oa r ei nam o n o g a m o u sr e l a t i o n s h i p
with one other partner. The HIV status of the partner is not necessarily known. If
the HIV status of the partner is known to be infected, this study design is called a
“discordant couples” design. If interference between units only occurs through sexual
contacts, the couples design avoids the complications of interference. In the absence
of interference, the potential outcomes notation can be simpliﬁed and we can focus
on the issue of exposure to HIV.
3.4.1 Implications for potential outcomes
We consider an experimental population of n units who are not infected and are
in a monogamous relationship over the course of the study. The non-experimental
population consists of the n partners in each relationship. For notational convenience,
we index the partner of experimental unit i as i+n. The simplifying assumption for
the couples design is that each unit only has sexual contact with his partner, which
obviates the problem of interference between units. The couples design implies the
plausibility of the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA Rubin, 1980),
which states the following:
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Assumption 3 (SUTVA) There is no interference between units and there are no
hidden versions of treatments. That is, for any z,z0 2Z N
n , if zi = z0
i for i =1 ,...,N,
then Y t
i (z)=Y t
i (z0) for all t 2 [0,T].
SUTVA allows us to simplify the potential outcomes notation so that a unit’s
potential outcome is only a function of the treatment assignment indicator of that
particular unit instead of the entire vector of treatment assignments. For this sec-
tion, we use the notation Y t
i (1) and Y t
i (0) to be the two potential outcomes of HIV
status for experimental unit i =1 ,...,n at time t under the active treatment and
control treatment respectively. Analogous notation applies to the number of contacts,
Ct
i,i+n(1) and Ct
i,i+n(0) are the number of contacts between unit i and partner i + n
at time t when unit i is assigned to the active and control treatment respectively.
The monogamous couples design implies Ct
i,i0(z)=0f o ri0 6= i + n, t 2 [0,T], and
z 2{ 0,1}.T h e s i m p l i ﬁ e d n o t a t i o n a l s o a p p l i e s t o e x p o s u r e s , t h a t i s Dt
i,i+n(1) and
Dt
i,i+n(0) are the number of times partner i + n exposes unit i up until time t under
the active and control treatments respectively.
Implicit in our assumptions is that the non-experimental population is una↵ected
by treatment assignments. For non-experimental unit i = n +1 ,...,2n,t h ei m p l i c a -
tion is that Y t
i (⇤)i sc o n s t a n tw i t hr e s p e c tt ot because unit i is not exposed to HIV
through any contacts. Therefore, in a monogamous couples design, the infectiousness
of the partner remains constant.
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3.4.2 Identical exposure
Equipped with the potential outcomes notation, we return to the identical expo-
sure condition of Greenwood and Yule (1915). We consider identical exposure based
on assumptions of the contact process and the infectiousness of a partner because
exposure is deﬁned with respect to these concepts.
First, we deﬁne the identical contacts assumption, which states the following:
Assumption 4 (Identical contacts) Treatment has no e↵ect on contacts. In the
general potential outcomes notation, for all z,z0 2Z N
n , Ct
ij(z)=Ct
ij(z0) for all t 2
[0,T].
For the monogamous couples design, this assumption states Ct
i,i+n(1) = Ct
i,i+n(0) for
all i =1 ,...,nand t 2 [0,T]. The interpretation of this assumption is that every unit
in the population has the same sexual behavior regardless of the treatment assigned.
Although deﬁning identical infectiousness in the general case is di cult, identical
infectiousness follows immediately from the couples design because the infectiousness
of each experimental unit’s partner is constant throughout the trial.
Even with an assumption of identical contacts and identical infectiousness in a
couples design, the notion of identical exposure is still di cult to deﬁne. To see why,
suppose the treatment is e↵ective at reducing the susceptibility of the disease for all
units. Then every unit under the treatment stays uninfected and susceptible longer.
Denote the length of time a unit is susceptible as Lt
i(z)u n d e rt r e a t m e n ta s s i g n m e n t
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vector z,t h a ti s
Li(z)=
8
> > > <
> > > :
inf{t 2 (0,T):Y t
i (z)=1 } if Y T
i (z)=1
T otherwise.
Using the simpliﬁed notation under the couples design, an e↵ective treatment for
experimental unit i implies Li(1)   Li(0), which implies DT
i,i+n(1)   DT
i,i+n(0) because
Ct
i,i+n(0) = Ct
i,i+n(1) is an increasing function in t.T h e r e f o r e ,a ne ↵ e c t i v et r e a t m e n t
on susceptibility necessarily implies an increase in the number of exposures. The
identical exposure condition can be violated with an e↵ective treatment. The simple
intuition is that if the treatment e↵ectively prevents infection for a given unit, then
that unit will receive more exposures under the active treatment because the unit will
become infected earlier under the control.
Deﬁning estimands
Causal e↵ects are comparisons of the potential outcomes under the two treatments
for a common set of units. We consider estimands for the monogamous couples design
and contrast ideas that use information on exposure and those that do not. We
use contrasts that are di↵erences, but other possible estimands could use di↵erent
contrasts like ratios.
We deﬁne the average causal e↵ect on cumulative incidence as
⌧ci =
1
n
n X
i=1
[Y
T
i (1)   Y
T
i (0)] = Y (1)   Y (0),
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where
Y (z)=
1
n
n X
i=1
Y
T
i (z)
for z 2{ 0,1}. The e↵ect on cumulative incidence is not a function of exposure1.
This estimand may not be scientiﬁcally interesting because we know that HIV is only
transmitted to units that are exposed to the disease. Thus, an estimand that is a
function of exposure is more relevant.
An estimand that is a function of exposure might compare the cumulative inci-
dence for the exposed. We deﬁne an estimand that is speciﬁc to the couples design
because the exposed subpopulation remains constant for this design. We deﬁne the
average causal e↵ect on cumulative incidence for the exposed as
⌧cife =
Pn
i=1:Y 0
i+n(⇤)=1[Y T
i (1)   Y T
i (0)]
Pn
i=1:Y 0
i+n(⇤)=1 1
.
This estimand is more relevant to the problem of assessing the e↵ect on susceptibility
of the disease because is considers the subpopulation of experimental units that are
exposed to the disease and actually have a chance of becoming infected.
An estimand that is analogous to the estimator in Halloran et al. (page 359, 1994)
is the di↵erence of infections per exposure:
⌧ipe =
Pn
i=1 Y T
i (1)
Pn
i=1 DT
i,i+n(1)
 
Pn
i=1 Y T
i (0)
Pn
i=1 DT
i,i+n(0)
.
This estimand does not necessarily have a causal interpretation because potential
1We describe this estimand as (not a) function of exposure instead of “(un)conditional on expo-
sure” as described in Rhodes et al. (1996) in order to di↵erentiate between the potential outcomes
and the model that is assumed or data that are collected.
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outcomes are not being compared for each unit. We can interpret this estimand as
treating each exposure as a unit and considering whether or not an infection occurs
at each exposure. Recall that the number of exposures can di↵er under treatment
and control (even under identical contacts and identical infectiousness), so this in-
terpretation is not a causal e↵ect because the set of exposures under treatment can
be di↵erent from the set of exposures under control. This detail can be obviated by
assuming all exposures are exchangeable, and then the exposures under treatment
are assumed to be comparable to exposures under the control. Assuming symmetry
on the exposures is a strong assumption. For instance, the right-most term will be
the same under the following two scenarios under the control treatment: (1) only
one unit is exposed and becomes infected after ten exposures and (2) ﬁve units are
exposed twice and one unit is infected on the second exposure. Even if exposures
are not truly exchangeable, the estimand that compares infections per exposure is
a useful description of the e↵ect of a prophylactic on HIV transmissions that re-
ﬂects the general interpretation of how disease is transmitted. For example, ⌧ipe can
be interpreted as the di↵erence in the probability of contracting the disease when
exposed—the secondary attack rate—under the active and control treatment.
3.5 Closed population design
We now consider an experimental design in which interference can occur between
units. The experimental population is composed of all units that are not infected
at the beginning of the trial and the non-experimental population is composed of
all units that are infected at the beginning of the trial. After treatment is assigned,
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all units can contact each other. We call this design a “closed population” design
because all possible contacts occur within the ﬁnite population for the duration of
the trial, so interference only occurs between units in this ﬁnite population.
In this section, we ﬁrst describe the causal estimands in the presence of interference
as deﬁned in HH. Next, we introduce a simple threshold model for the number of
exposures until infection occurs. Combined with a sexual network of contacts, this
model produces ﬁxed potential outcomes for every treatment assignment vector. It
additionally allows for simple description of the treatment e↵ect on a unit’s threshold.
We close the section with an examination of the repercussions of this model on the
estimands of HH in a simulated network of sexual contacts.
3.5.1 Causal estimands with interference
Interference between units implies that di↵erent treatment assignment vectors
(e.g., z,z0 2Z N
n )c a nh a v ed i ↵ e r e n to u t c o m e sf o ra ne x p e r i m e n t a lu n i te v e ni ft h a t
unit is assigned the same treatment (e.g., zi = z0
i,b u tYi(z) 6= Yi(z0)f o rs o m ei 
n). HH apply two strategies when summarizing treatment e↵ects in the presence
of interference. First, for a given unit, HH average the potential outcomes over a
speciﬁed intervention program, which dictates how treatments are assigned to the
experimental population. Secondly, HH compare these average potential outcomes
within and across intervention programs. The treatment for a each unit becomes a
two factor treatment: the ﬁrst factor determines the intervention program for the
population and the second factor determines the active or control treatment for each
unit.
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To make this idea more concrete, we follow HH and consider two intervention
programs that randomly assign a speciﬁed proportion of the experimental population
to the active treatment. Denote the two programs as   and  ,w h i c hd e n o t et h e
proportion of experimental units assigned to the active treatment under intervention
program for  ,  2{ 0,1/n,2/n,...,n/n} and   6=  .
An experimental design that exploits the relationship between these two treatment
factors is the split plot or pseudo cluster randomization. In these designs, ﬁrst the
intervention program is randomly assigned to a population and then given the ﬁrst
randomization, the second stage randomly assigns the unit level treatments following
the randomly assigned intervention program. We do not discuss further inference for
these designs because our focus is on quantifying interference through deﬁnitions of
causal estimands (see HH for details on inference).
Average potential outcomes
With the additional treatment factor that speciﬁes the intervention program, HH
summarize the potential outcomes for unit i under assignment to treatment z and
speciﬁed intervention program   by averaging all potential outcomes with respect
to the intervention program given unit i is assigned to treatment z.T h a ti s ,d e ﬁ n e
the individual average potential outcome for experimental unit i =1 ,...,n,u n d e r
treatment z 2{ 0,1} for intervention program   as
Y i(z, ) ⌘
X
z2ZN
n
Y
T
i (z)Pr (Z = z|Zi = z).
The unit level average potential outcome can be summarized by averaging over
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all experimental units in the experimental population. That is, deﬁne the population
average potential outcome under treatment z for intervention program   as
Y (z, ) ⌘
1
n
n X
i=1
Y i(z, ).
The individual average potential outcomes are deﬁned for a intervention program
and treatment assignment, but we could also consider an average potential outcome
that does not constrain the treatment assignment of the unit. Deﬁne the marginal
individual average potential outcome for experimental unit i =1 ,...,nunder inter-
vention program   as
Y i( ) ⌘
X
z2ZN
n
Y
T
i (z)Pr (Z = z).
As before, the unit level averages can be summarized by averaging over all ex-
perimental units. Deﬁne the marginal population average potential outcome under
intervention program   as
Y ( )=
1
n
n X
i=1
Y i( ).
Direct, indirect, total, and overall causal e↵ects
From the population average potential outcomes, HH deﬁne direct, indirect, total,
and overall causal e↵ects. The following deﬁnitions of direct and indirect e↵ects are
causal estimands in the presence of interference and should not be confused with
similar terminology of direct and indirect e↵ects associated with causal graphs (e.g.,
Pearl, 1995).
The population average direct causal e↵ect for intervention program   is the dif-
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ference of the population average potential outcomes under the active and control
treatments for intervention program  ,t h a ti s
DCEY( ) ⌘ Y (1, )   Y (0, ).
Intuitively, the direct e↵ect compares taking the active treatment to the control treat-
ment under the same intervention program. Thus, it is assessing the “direct” e↵ect
of the experimental treatment compared to the control treatment.
The population average indirect causal e↵ect for intervention program   compared
to intervention program   is the di↵erence of the population average potential out-
comes under the control treatment for the two intervention programs   and  ,t h a t
is
ICEY( , ) ⌘ Y (0, )   Y (0, ).
Intuitively, the indirect e↵ect compares taking the control treatment under two di↵er-
ent intervention programs. Thus, any e↵ect on the outcomes is due to an “indirect”
e↵ect from the intervention program and not from taking the active treatment.
The population average total causal e↵ect for intervention program   compared to
intervention program   is the di↵erence of the population average potential outcomes
under receipt of the active treatment in intervention program   and the average of
the potential outcomes under receipt of the control treatment in intervention program
 ,t h a ti s
TCEY( , )=Y (1, )   Y (0, ).
Intuitively, the total e↵ect compares taking the active treatment under intervention
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program   to taking the control treatment under intervention program  .T h u s ,a n y
e↵ect on the outcome is due to the combined or “total” e↵ect of taking the active
treatment and the intervention program compared to the control treatment and some
control intervention program. The total e↵ects is the sum of the indirect and direct
e↵ects: TCEY( , )=DCEY( )+ICEY( , ).
Lastly, the population average overall e↵ect for intervention program   compared
to intervention program   is the di↵erence of the marginal population average poten-
tial outcomes for the two intervention programs, that is
OCEY( , )=Y ( )   Y ( ).
Intuitively, the overall e↵ect compares the number of infections in the population
under the two di↵erent intervention programs and ignores who actually receives the
treatment. Thus, the e↵ect is an “overall” comparison of the two di↵erent treatment
regimes.
Example 3.5.1 We demonstrate the computation of these e↵ects for a ﬁnite popu-
lation of N =3units and experimental population of n =2units. We let   =1 /2
and   =0 . The outcomes for the three assignment vectors are provided in Table 3.1.
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We have
DCEY( )=0  1/2= 1/2,
ICEY( , )=1 /2   1= 1/2,
TCEY( , )=0  1= 1,
OCEY( , )=1 /4   1= 3/4.
Table 3.1: Outcomes for example population under three treatment assignment vec-
tors. The ﬁrst treatment assignment vector corresponds to   =0 ;t h en e x tt w o
treatment assignment vectors correspond to   =1 /2.
t
z 0 T
Y t
1(z) 01
(0,0,⇤) Y t
2(z) 01
Y t
3(z) 11
Y t
1(z) 00
(0,1,⇤) Y t
2(z) 00
Y t
3(z) 11
Y t
1(z) 00
(1,0,⇤) Y t
2(z) 01
Y t
3(z) 11
We deﬁned the direct, indirect, total, and overall causal e↵ects on infection. We
later consider these e↵ects on the amount of exposure for each unit. Using analogous
notation (i.e., substitute DT
i (z)f o rY T
i (z)), let DCED( ), ICED( , ), TCED( , ),
and OCED( , )b et h ep o p u l a t i o na v e r a g ed i r e c t ,i n d i r e c t ,t o t a l ,a n do v e r a l lc a u s a l
e↵ects on total exposure.
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3.5.2 Threshold model for HIV transmission
The estimands from HH rely on ﬁxed potential outcomes for each treatment as-
signment vector. We propose a threshold model for HIV transmission that produces
ﬁxed outcomes of HIV infection for every treatment assignment vector in combination
with the network of sexual contacts. We make the simplifying assumption of identical
contacts, and suppress the dependence of the network on the treatment assignment
vector.
The threshold model assumes that for a given unit there is a ﬁxed number of
exposures to HIV such that the unit becomes infected once he is exposed as many
times as his threshold. We assume all exposures count the same towards the total
number of exposures. That is, exposures at di↵erent times and from di↵erent units
all increment the number of exposures. Additionally, we make stable unit treatment
value assumption for the threshold values, so we can consider the threshold under
assignment to the active treatment and control treatment. As discussed in Halloran
and Struchiner (1995), considering the potential outcomes as functions of exposures
“seems to win back the stability assumption.” We let Mi(z)b et h et h r e s h o l dv a l u e
for experimental unit i under assignment to treatment z 2{ 0,1}.
Under SUTVA for the threshold model, interference on infections is due to in-
terference on the number of exposures. That is, suppose we have two treatment
assignment vectors z and z0 where zi = z0
i. Unit i becomes infected under the treat-
ment assignment vector if the number of exposures reaches the threshold, but the
number of exposures may be di↵erent under the two treatment assignment vectors.
For z and z0,a ne x a m p l eo fi n t e r f e r e n c eo c c u r r i n gi sDT
i (z) <D T
i (z0)=Mi(zi), in
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which case Y T
i (z)=06= Y T
i (z0)=1 .
The threshold model provides a simple way to describe the e↵ect of treatment
on a unit. For example, if Mi(1) >M i(0), then the treatment has an e↵ect of
preventing infection for unit i.W e c a n a l s o c o n s i d e r h o m o g e n e o u s e ↵ e c t s a c r o s s
units, for example the multiplicative e↵ect Mi(1) = d✓Mi(0)e where ✓   0a n ddxe is
the smallest integer greater than x;a ne ↵ e c t i v et r e a t m e n tw o u l dc o r r e s p o n dt o✓>1.
We call such e↵ects threshold treatment e↵ects to distinguish them from our previous
estimands. We return to the simple example with three units to demonstrate the
threshold model.
Example 3.5.2 We return to the example of a ﬁnite population of N =3units
and and experimental population of n =2units. The experiment occurs over time
T =5 . The contact process (under the assumption of identical contacts) is provided
in the ﬁrst three rows of a Table 3.2. We assume the M1(0) = M2(0) = 2 and
M1(1) = M2(1) = 4. The potential outcomes of HIV infection are also provided in
Table 3.2 for three di↵erent treatment assignment vectors.
Under treatment assignment vector z =( 0 ,0,⇤), unit 2 is exposed twice by unit 3
and contracts HIV on the second exposure because M2(0) = 2. Unit 2 then exposes
unit 1, who contracts HIV on the second exposure. Both units in the experimental
population contract HIV under this treatment assignment.
Under treatment assignment vector z =( 0 ,1,⇤), unit 2 is exposed twice by unit 3
but does not contract HIV because he does not reach his threshold of M2(1) = 4. Unit
1 is not exposed at all and therefore does not contract HIV.
Under treatment assignment vector z =( 1 ,0,⇤), unit 2 is exposed twice by unit 3
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Table 3.2: Example of the threshold model for M1(0) = M2(0) = 2 and M1(1) =
M2(1) = 4.
t
z 012345
Ct
1,2 000123
Ct
2,3 012222
Ct
1,3 000000
Y t
1(z) 000011
(0,0,⇤) Y t
2(z) 001111
Y t
3(z) 111111
Y t
1(z) 000000
(0,1,⇤) Y t
2(z) 000000
Y t
3(z) 111111
Y t
1(z) 000000
(1,0,⇤) Y t
2(z) 001111
Y t
3(z) 111111
and does contract HIV. Unit 2 exposes unit 1 three times, but unit 1 does not contract
HIV because he did not reach his threshold of M1(1) = 4.
Although the threshold model provides a simple description of the treatment ef-
fects, the ramiﬁcations for the estimands of HH are not obvious. This simple example
demonstrates how to incorporate the threshold model with the network of sexual con-
tacts to produce ﬁxed potential outcomes for each treatment assignment vector.
The threshold model is not probabilistic. Mi(z)c a nb et h o u g h to fa sal a t e n t
variable describing a unit’s innate susceptibility to HIV under assignment to treat-
ment z. Assuming a probability model for Mi(z) leads to standard models for disease
transmission. For example, if Mi(z) ⇠ Geometric(⇡z), we can interpret exposures
as independent Bernoulli trials with probability of success (i.e., disease transmission)
⇡z.T h ea s s u m p t i o n so ft h i sm o d e la r es i m i l a rt ot h o s ef o rt h ee s t i m a n d⌧ipe,w h i c hi s
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the ﬁnite population analog of comparing the parameters ⇡1 to ⇡0.I no u rs i m u l a t i o n
study, we simulate Mi(z)u s i n gt h eg e o m e t r i cd i s t r i b u t i o n .
3.5.3 Assessing interference on a simulated closed population
study
We provide a simulation of a closed population design in order to demonstrate
the relationship between direct, indirect, total, and overall causal e↵ects on both
infections and exposures. We compare various values of intervention program   to
a“ c o n t r o l ”i n t e r v e n t i o np r o g r a m  =0 ,w h i c hc o r r e s p o n d st on oo n er e c e i v i n gt h e
treatment. We also consider various values of the threshold treatment e↵ect as de-
scribed using the threshold model with a multiplicative e↵ect. Our simulations show
that the amount of interference is a function of the intervention program and the
threshold treatment e↵ect. The important take away from examining all four esti-
mands is that there is potential for dramatic variability due to interference. We ﬁrst
describe the simulation and then summarize the results.
Simulated closed population
The experimental population is composed of n =5 0 0 0u n i n f e c t e du n i t sa n dt h e
non-experimental population is composed of N   n =5 5 5i n f e c t e du n i t s . T h a ti s ,
10% of the population is HIV infected at the beginning of the trial. Initial infection
status of each unit is simulated once, independent of all the other quantities. The
length of the study is three years.
We simulate the network of contacts once under the assumption of identical con-
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tacts. Details of the how we simulate the sexual contacts are provided in Appendix
C. An accurate simulation of a sexual network is a di cult task, but we attempted to
replicate some descriptive statistics from observed sexual networks in the literature.
Summaries of the network are provided in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Summaries statistics of the network of sexual contacts. The degree distri-
bution summarizes the number of sexual partners per unit. The network summaries
describe the “connectedness” of the network (compare to similar summaries in Hel-
leringer and Kohler, 2007). The last table summarizes the number of sexual contacts
per unit over the course of the study.
Degree distribution
Degree Value
1 0.62
2 0.24
3 0.06
4 0.03
> 4 0.05
Network summaries
Description Value
%o fc l u s t e r so fs i z e< 5 82%
%o fp o p u l a t i o ni nc l u s t e r so fs i z e< 5 34%
%o fp o p u l a t i o ni nl a r g e s tc l u s t e r 47%
Sexual contacts per unit
Description Value
Mean 169
Standard deviation 149
Median 127
25th percentile 36
75th percentile 300
Given the network of sexual contacts, we use the threshold model to generate
ﬁxed potential outcomes for each treatment assignment. We simulate the threshold
value under the control treatment using the geometric distribution with probability
of transmission ⇡ =0 .02. The threshold value under the alternative varies according
to the multiplicative threshold treatment e↵ect of ✓ 2{ 2,4,8,16}.
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With the exception of the “control” intervention program with no units assigned to
the active treatment, calculating the population average potential outcomes requires
enumerating several treatment assignment vectors. For example, if   =1 /2, then
there are
 5000
2500
 
treatment assignment vectors to consider. We do not enumerate
all possible vectors, but instead perform a Monte Carlo simulation. We randomly
sample 1000 treatment assignment vectors from each intervention program in order
to estimate the ﬁnite population estimands.
Direct, indirect, total, and overall e↵ects in simulated population
Given our closed population, we quantify the interference within a randomized
experiment using the population average direct, indirect, total, and overall causal
e↵ects on infection, which are plotted in Figure 3.1 under di↵erent treatment inter-
vention programs and di↵erent threshold treatment e↵ects. As a point of reference,
12.3% of the experimental units are infected under the control intervention program.
Thus, average e↵ects (comparing intervention program to the control program) of -0.1
would be considered a huge success (i.e., 81% decrease), but e↵ects of -0.01 could still
be considered a modest success (i.e., 8% decrease).
Our ﬁrst general observation is that there is large variability in these estimands
across di↵erent treatment regimes and treatment e↵ects. For a given threshold treat-
ment e↵ect, the trends of the average direct, indirect, and total causal e↵ects as
functions of the proportion treated is due solely to interference between units.
One intuitive observation is that the magnitude of the indirect average causal e↵ect
increases as the proportion of units that are treated increases. When only 5% of the
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Figure 3.1: Direct, indirect, total, and overall average causal e↵ects on proportion of
experimental units that contract HIV. The y-axis corresponds to the magnitude and
direction of the e↵ect; the x-axis corresponds to the proportion of the experimental
population that is treated. The di↵erent colors denote di↵erent multiplicative treat-
ment e↵ects for the threshold model. The dotted lines for indirect, total, and overall
e↵ects denote the maximum possible treatment e↵ect.
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units are assigned to treatment, there is essentially no indirect average causal e↵ect,
whereas when ✓ =2t h ei n d i r e c te ↵ e c ti s- 0 . 0 0 5a n d- 0 . 0 1 0w h e n5 0 %a n d9 0 %o f
the population are randomly treated respectively. A large indirect e↵ect corresponds
to the concept of interference. Thus, interference increases as the proportion of the
population that is treated increases and the e↵ectiveness of the treatment increases.
Perhaps less intuitive is that the direct e↵ect shrinks towards zero as the pro-
portion of units that are treated increases. The explanation for this result is that
the indirect e↵ects are protecting units that would have been protected “directly” if
assigned the active treatment. This explanation becomes clear when examining the
total average causal e↵ect, which is the sum of the direct and indirect e↵ects. The
magnitude of the total average causal e↵ect shows a modest increase.
As pointed out in HH (Theorem 1), the comparison of observed infection rates
in the active treatment and control treatment groups is an unbiased estimate of the
direct e↵ect. If no interference is assumed, then this estimator might be incorrectly
interpreted as estimating the di↵erence in cumulative incidence rates under treatment
and control without acknowledging the potential beneﬁts of interference (i.e., the
indirect e↵ect). Estimation of indirect, total, and overall e↵ects requires either more
populations that could be assigned di↵erent treatment regimes, or detailed knowledge
of the network of contacts.
The direct, indirect, and total e↵ects are descriptions of unit level e↵ects. In
contrast, the overall causal e↵ect might be more relevant from the perspective of
public health, because the overall e↵ect summarizes e↵ect of the intervention program,
which could be implemented in other populations.
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Figure 3.2: Direct, indirect, total, and overall average causal e↵ects on the number
of exposures. The y-axis corresponds to the magnitude and direction of the e↵ect;
negative e↵ects correspond to a reduction in exposures. The x-axis corresponds to
the proportion of the experimental population that is treated. The di↵erent colors
denote di↵erent threshold treatment e↵ects.
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We also consider the direct, indirect, total, and overall average causal e↵ects on
the average number of exposures per unit. These e↵ects are plotted in Figure 3.2.
This plot demonstrates two points discussed previously. First, the positive direct
average causal e↵ect follow from the argument that an e↵ective HIV prophylactic
necessarily increases the number of exposures. Secondly, the negative indirect e↵ect
follows from the argument that assignment to the active treatment may prevent some
units from contracting HIV and exposing other units to HIV. The modest size of the
indirect e↵ect is partly due to averaging over all units, a large number of whom are
never exposed.
3.6 Conclusion
Assessing the e cacy of treatments for preventing infectious disease is a quintessen-
tial example of interference occurring between units. We discuss the role of exposure
to disease as the reason for interference between units. In the case of a prophylactic
treatment for HIV, interference can be described as occurring within a network of
sexual contacts. Interference occurs because the treatment assignment for some units
a↵ects the degree to which they expose other units to HIV.
We demonstrate these concepts in a simulated population using a threshold model
for the number of exposures until infection. Our simulation study shows the relation-
ship between the direct, indirect, and total causal e↵ects that are deﬁned in HH. The
simulation study shows intuitive results about the amount of interference depending
on the e↵ectiveness of the treatment as well as the proportion of units in the pop-
ulation that are treated. Perhaps less intuitive are the results about direct e↵ects
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attenuating as the proportion of treated subjects increases due to the indirect e↵ect
of the treatment. Our results contribute to the understanding of causal inference
in the presence of interference for studies of prophylactic treatments for infectious
diseases by examining a the speciﬁc mechanism by which HIV is transmitted.
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Supplement to Chapter 1
A.1 Estimand for analysis that discards rescued
subjects
We consider the estimator that discards rescued subjects ˆ  dr as deﬁned in Equation
(1.2). We argue that for a ﬁxed population of size N and randomly assigning Nt units
98Appendix A: Supplement to Chapter 1
to treatment and the remaining Np = N   Nt units to placebo, E[ˆ  dr] ⇡  dr where
 dr =
E
0
@
X
i2O(1,0)
Y
obs
i
1
A
E
0
@
X
i2O(1,0)
1
1
A
 
E
0
@
X
i2O(0,0)
Y
obs
i
1
A
E
0
@
X
i2O(0,0)
1
1
A
=
X
i:Si=NN
E[Zi]Yi(1) +
X
i:Si=NR
E[Zi]Yi(1)
X
i:Si=NN
E[Zi]+
X
i:Si=NR
E[Zi]
 
X
i:Si=NN
(1   E[Zi])Yi(0) +
X
i:Si=RN
(1   E[Zi])Yi(0)
X
i:Si=NN
(1   E[Zi]) +
X
i:Si=RN
(1   E[Zi])
=
⇡NNY NN(1) + ⇡NRY NR(1)
⇡NN + ⇡NR
 
⇡NNY NN(0) + ⇡RNY RN(0)
⇡NN + ⇡RN
,
where the last line follows from noting E[Zi]=Nt/N for all i =1 ,...,N.
To see the approximation, consider the Taylor series expansion of E
⇥
x
y
⇤
at µx and
µy, the mean of positive random variables x and y respectively:
E

x
y
 
⇡
µx
µy
+
µx
µ3
y
Var(y)  
1
2µ2
y
Cov(x,y).
We apply this approximation twice for the two ratios of ˆ  dr.F o rt h eﬁ r s tt e r mo fˆ  dr,
let
x =
1
Nt
X
i2O(1,0)
Y
obs
i and y =
1
Nt
X
i2O(1,0)
1.
The ﬁrst term of the approximation corresponds to the ﬁrst term of  dr.M o r e o v e r ,
because x and y1 are sample means, Var(y)a n dC o v ( x,y)a r eo nt h eo r d e ro f 1
Nt.
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An analogous approximation to the second term of Equation (1.2) shows that ˆ  dr is
ab i a s e de s t i m a t o ro f dr where the bias is on the order of max( 1
Nt, 1
Np). Thus, ˆ  dr
estimates the estimand  dr with a bias that goes to zero as Nt and Np increase to
inﬁnity.
A.2 Imputing missing data
We describe the imputation of principal strata membership and missing potential
outcome of the clinical endpoint for each subject, given a posterior draw of the pa-
rameters and the observed data. First, given the parameter ✓,a l ls u b j e c t s ’p r i n c i p a l
strata membership and missing potential outcomes are independent of each other, so
we focus on imputing the missing data for subject i =1 ,...,N.W e ﬁ r s t d r a w t h e
principal stratum membership Si,a n dt h e n ,c o n d i t i o n a lo nSi,w ed r a wt h em i s s i n g
potential outcome Yi(1 Zi). We suppress the conditioning on the observed data and
parameters for conciseness; instead we use subscript “post” to denote this conditional
probability.
We consider the four possible observed combinations of assigned treatment (Zi)
and observed indicator of receipt of rescue medication (Dobs
i ). If i 2O (0,0), then
Prpost(Si = s)=
8
> > > <
> > > :
1i f s = NN
0o t h e r w i s e .
1In complete generality, either denominator has a non-zero probability of being zero, and thus
the mean of ˆ  dr does not always exist. In the context of rescue medication, if the number of never
rescued subjects is larger than both Nt and Np, that is N⇡NN > max(Nt,N p), then there is zero
probability of either denominator being zero.
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If i 2O (1,1), then
Prpost(Si = s)=
8
> > > <
> > > :
1i f s =R R
0o t h e r w i s e .
If i 2O (0,1), then
Prpost(Si = s) /
8
> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
⇡RR,i · Poi(Y obs
i ; 0,RR,i)i f s =R R
⇡NR,i · Poi(Y obs
i ; 0,NR,i)i f s = NR
0o t h e r w i s e .
If i 2O (1,0), then
Prpost(Si = s) /
8
> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
⇡NR,i · Poi(Y obs
i ; 0,NR,i)i f s = NR
⇡NN,i · Poi(Y obs
i ; 0,NN,i)i f s = NN
0o t h e r w i s e .
Given Si = s and Zi = z for s 2{ RR, NR, NN} and z 2{ 0,1},w ed r a wt h e
missing potential outcome Yi(1   z)f r o maP o i s s o nd i s t r i b u t i o nw i t hm e a n 1 z,s,i.
By our conditional independence assumption on the joint distribution of the potential
outcomes Yi(0) and Yi(1), the missing potential outcome does not depend on the
observed potential outcome given the principal strata membership.
101Appendix A: Supplement to Chapter 1
A.3 Checking software using prior and posterior
simulations
We ensure that our implementation of our Bayesian sampler is correct using the
simulation-based technique described in Cook et al. (2006). The procedure samples
one draw of the parameter, say ✓0,f r o mt h e( p r o p e r )p r i o rd i s t r i b u t i o n( f o rn o w ,
suppose ✓ is one dimensional). Conditional on ✓0,s a m p l et h ed a t a ,s a yg e n e r i c a l l yy,
from the likelihood. Given the data, y,t h es o f t w a r et h a ti sb e i n gc h e c k e dg e n e r a t e s
several draws from the posterior distribution of the parameters, say ✓1,...,✓ R for R
replicates (or perhaps iterations). The key idea is that ✓0 is a valid draw from the
posterior distribution. Therefore, if the software is correctly sampling from the poste-
rior distribution of the parameters, then ✓1,...,✓ R and ✓0 have the same distribution.
To assess whether or not ✓0 and ✓1,...,✓ R come from the same posterior distribution,
we repeat the process and note that the random variable
q =
1
R
R X
r=1
{✓0  ✓r}
will have an approximate uniform distribution under repeated samples of the prior
distribution and correct sampling of the posterior distribution (see Theorem 1 in Cook
et al., 2006). For multidimensional ✓,w ec a l c u l a t eq for each component of ✓.
We perform checks of the software implementing the sampler using the prior dis-
tribution describe in Section 5.3.2. We simulate 1000 replications of this procedure
and generate a distribution of q for each of the 23 parameters. For each of the 23
parameters, we perform a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of q (assuming a uniform null
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distribution); p-values are presented in Table A.1. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests do
no provide evidence against the null hypothesis that the code has a bug. Figure A.1
shows QQ-plots of the empirical quantiles of   1(q)a g a i n s tt h ee x p e c t e dq u a n t i l e s
of a standard normal distribution. If the software is performing correctly,   1(q)h a s
an o r m a ld i s t r i b u t i o n .W eu s et h ep r o b i tt r a n s f o r m a t i o ni no r d e rt oa c c e n t u a t et h e
tails of the distribution. Except for some deviations in the tails of the distribution,
the QQ-plots suggest no large deviations from normality and no evidence that the
code has a bug. Therefore, we believe that the software is properly sampling from
the posterior distribution of the parameters.
A.4 Model checking with posterior predictive dis-
tributions
We check to see if the model is consistent with observed data. The general idea
is to compare aspects of the observed data to the posterior predictive distribution
of a new set of data. Rubin et al. (1984) proposed the posterior predictive p-value,
deﬁned as
ppp =P r ( T(data
pp)   T(data) | data),
where data
pp represents the posterior predictive distribution of the data and T is
a test statistic. Observing small (and perhaps large) values of ppp correspond to a
lack of ﬁt for the model. We consider the posterior predictive distribution for the
same set of units (i.e., X is held constant) and treatment assignment (i.e., Z is held
constant). Gelman et al. (2003, Chapter 6) and Gelman (2003) discuss the use of
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Figure A.1: QQ-plots of empirical quantiles of   1(q) and theoretical quantiles of the
standard normal distribution (corresponding to the x-axis and y-axis respectively).
Parameters for each plot correspond to the ordering in Table A.1 from right to left,
top to bottom.
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Table A.1: P-values from Kolmogorov-Smirnov test that q is distributed uniformly.
Parentheses following subscripts of X indicate to which covariate the parameter
corresponds.
Parameter P-value
 0,RR 0.26
 1,RR 1.00
 0,NR 0.90
 1,NR 0.68
 0,NN 0.63
 1,NN 0.88
 X(prior relapses) 0.78
 X(Gd lesions) 0.34
 X(T2 lesions) 0.31
 X(EDSS) 0.83
 X(Age) 0.48
 NN 0.03
 NR 0.95
 NN,X(prior relapses) 0.96
 NR,X(prior relapses) 0.80
 NN,X(Gd lesions) 0.49
 NR,X(Gd lesions) 0.64
 NN,X(T2 lesions) 0.05
 NR,X(T2 lesions) 0.38
 NN,X(EDSS) 0.29
 NR,X(EDSS) 0.77
 NN,X(age) 0.16
 NR,X(age) 0.10
graphical summaries for the posterior predictive checks. In the Section A.4.1, we
quantify ppp for test statistics that target whether or not the data is over dispersed
for the Poisson model. In the Section A.4.2 we consider graphical summaries that
examine the relationship between the observed outcome and the observed indicator
of rescue medication.
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A.4.1 Numerical summaries
One concern with using a Poisson model is over dispersion. To examine whether
or not the proposed model captures the correct amount of variability in the data, we
consider two test statistics: the sample variance, S2 = 1
N 1
P 
Y obs
i   Y
obs 2,a n d
the maximum, M =m a x {Y obs
i : i =1 ,...,N}.E v i d e n c e o f o v e r d i s p e r s i o n w o u l d
correspond to a posterior predictive distributions of these test statistics having most
of the mass below the observed value the test statistics (i.e., small ppp). The poste-
rior predictive distributions of the test statistics along with the correspond posterior
predictive p-value are provided in Figure A.2. These numerical summaries suggest
that the Poisson model is capturing the variability in the data.
A.4.2 Graphical summaries
We also consider graphical summaries of the data to investigate the overall distri-
bution of the data compared to the distribution of the predicted data. Our analysis
focuses on the principal strata level e↵ects, so we are particularly interested in exam-
ining the observed outcome distribution in relation to the observed indicator of rescue
medication. Thus, we consider graphical summaries by the four combinations of treat-
ment assignment and observed indicator of rescue medication. Figure A.3 compares
the posterior predictive distributions against the distribution of the data for the ob-
served outcomes via histograms. Lack of ﬁt would be detected through dissimilar
histograms for the posterior predictive distributions and the data distribution. Ad-
ditionally, Figure A.4 shows QQ-plots of the posterior predictive distribution against
the data distribution; points are jittered to handle ties. Lack of ﬁt would manifest
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Figure A.2: Posterior predictive distribution of the maximum and sample variance
for all subjects, subjects assigned to placebo, and subjects assigned to the active
treatment. Solid vertical lines indicate the observed values of the test statistic.
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in deviations from the 45 degree line. Neither graphical summary shows posterior
predictive distributions that di↵er from the data distribution. We conclude that the
model reﬂects the observed outcomes for each combination of treatment and observed
indicator of rescue medication.
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Figure A.3: Histograms of the posterior predictive distribution of observed outcomes
overlaid against the histograms of the data distribution of observed outcomes. Poste-
rior distributions are plotted in dark grey and the data distribution is plotted in light
grey (note that overlap creates an even darker grey). Each column corresponds to
an independent posterior predictive sample and each row corresponds to the labelled
combination of treatment assignment and observed indicator of rescue medication.
All x-axes range from zero to eight; y-axes are constant within row, but not across
rows.
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Figure A.4: QQ-plots of the data distribution of observed outcome (x-axis) and the
posterior predictive distribution of observed outcomes (y-axis). Points are jittered to
handle the several ties that occur in the discrete data. Each column corresponds to
an independent posterior predictive sample and each row corresponds to the labelled
combination of treatment assignment and observed indicator of rescue medication.
Both x-axes and y-axes range from zero to eight with the grid delineating the discrete
values.
110Appendix B
Supplement to Chapter 2
We want to prove Equation (2.8) that states, given a test statistic of the aggregated
observed data, y,t h ep o s t e r i o rp r e d i c t i v ep - v a l u et h a tc o n d i t i o n so nt h et h ee n t i r e
observed data, yobs and W, is the same as the posterior predictive p-value that
conditions on the aggregated data under the conditions that the prior distribution on
the array of potential outcomes is placed on the su ciently sharp partition ⌥0 and
every element within each set of the partition treated symmetrically. The conditions
state that
p
 
Y
 
=
8
> > > <
> > > :
Pr
 
Y2Y0(N11
⇤ )
 
|Y0(N11
⇤ )| if Y 2Y 0(N11
⇤ ),
0o t h e r w i s e ,
where |A| denotes the cardinality of set A.I fw es h o w
p
 
y
pp | yobs,W
 
=p
 
y
pp | y
 
, (B.1)
the equality follows trivially.
111Appendix B: Supplement to Chapter 2
We ﬁrst apply the law of total probability to the left hand side of Equation (B.1):
p
 
y
pp | yobs,W
 
=
X
N11
⇤
2
4
X
Y2Y0(N11
⇤ )
p
 
y
pp | Y
 
p
 
Y | yobs,W
 
3
5
=
X
N11
⇤
p
 
y
pp | Y 2Y 0(N
11
⇤ )
 
2
4
X
Y2Y0(N11
⇤ )
p
 
Y | yobs,W
 
3
5 (B.2)
We drop the term yobs and W from the ﬁrst probability in the summation because
given the array of potential outcomes, the predictive data will be independent of the
observed data. Line (B.2) follows from ⌥0 being a su ciently sharp partition for the
aggregated observed outcomes. Showing the summation inside the brackets in line
(B.2) equals
Pr
 
Y 2Y 0(N
11
⇤ ) | y
 
will complete the proof. To see this fact, we argue that these two quantities are
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proportional as follows:
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/ Pr
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Y 2Y 0(N
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where Yobs
0 (N11
⇤ )={Y 2Y 0(N11
⇤ ):yobs follows from W and Y} and all proportion-
ality statements imply a multiplicative constant that is a function of yobs and W.
Line (B.3) follows by Bayes rule. Line (B.4) follows from the likelihood as deﬁned
in Equation (2.7) and the conditions on the prior distribution. Line (B.5) partitions
the set Yobs
0 (N11
⇤ )i n t ot h es p e c i ﬁ cv a l u e so ft h et r e a t e du n i ta g g r e g a t e dp o t e n t i a l
outcomes, M,w h i c hi sam a n y - t o - o n ef u n c t i o no fY and Z.L i n e ( B . 6 ) c o u n t s t h e
number of arrays of potential outcomes that result in M0⇤ =( M00
0⇤,M01
0⇤,M10
0⇤,M11
0⇤)i n
combination with Z. First consider the M treated units. There are yt treated units
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that are diseased that belong to either the doomed or harmed principal strata; there
are
✓
yt
M11
0⇤
◆
possible conﬁgurations for these yt units. Similarly, the M  yt treated units that are
non-diseased belong to either the protected or immune principal strata; there are
✓
M   yt
M00
0⇤
◆
possible conﬁgurations for these M   yt units. The same argument for the yc and
N   M   yc units in the control group provides the remaining terms in line (B.6).
Line (B.7) rearranges terms and notes that
|Y0(N
11
⇤ )| =
✓
N
N00
0⇤,N01
0 ,N10
0 ,N11
⇤
◆
.
Line (B.8) recognizes the probability mass function of y in Equation (2.6). Line (B.9)
follows from Bayes rule and completes the proof.
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The simulated network of sexual contacts is broken into two elements. First,
simulate the “relationships” in the network, that is the edges between nodes. Second,
given a “relationship” exists, simulate the number of contacts for each relationship
and the time at which each sexual contact occurred.
The network edges were sampled using the degree.sequence.game function in
the igraph library in R (Csardi and Nepusz, 2006). The degree sequence was sampled
from a power law distribution. Speciﬁcally, the probability of degree d was propor-
tional to d 2.5 for d 2{ 1,...,20}.T h ep a r a m e t r i cm o d e lf o rt h ed e g r e ed i s t r i b u t i o n
was chosen to create a network similar to the observed network of sexual relations in
Helleringer and Kohler (2007), in particular the proportion of small clusters and the
number of units belonging to the smaller clusters and largest cluster.
Once the relationships were sampled, we next simulate the number of contacts and
when they occurred. First, we simulate the start and end time of each relationship.
The duration of the relationship was ﬁrst sampled from an exponential random vari-
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able with mean inversely proportional to the maximum number of degrees of the two
units. For example, if two units have a relationship, and one partner has one degree
and the other has two degrees, then the length of the relationship is a exponential
random variable with mean µ/2w h e r eµ =3c o r r e s p o n d i n gt o3y e a r s( t h el e n g t ho f
the study). The intuition is that units with more sexual partners will have shorter
relationships. The average length of time for a monogamous relationship was 3 years.
The midpoint of each relationship is randomly sampled to get the starting time and
end time of each relationship, which are truncated to 0 and 3 respectively if they fall
outside of the duration of the study. Every relationship now has a starting point and
end point.
Given the start and end time of the each relationship, a Poisson random variable
is drawn with exposure the length of time of the relationship (i.e. the end time minus
the start time). For example, if a relationship started at time 0.5 and ended at time
1.1, the number of contacts is a Poisson random variable with mean 0.6  where   =6 0
corresponds to the rate of sexual contacts per year in a relationship. If the number of
contacts is greater than zero, the times of sexual contacts are uniformly drawn over
the duration of the relationship. If the number of contacts is zero, we arbitrarily assign
one contact occurring at the beginning of the relationship. All random variables are
drawn independent of each other, so relationships may overlap and some units will
be in multiple relationships at the same time.
The choice of parametric models was arbitrarily chosen, but the parameters set-
tings were chosen to give reasonable results. Thus, an average of ﬁve sex acts per
month was based on the results from Karim et al. (2010). Decomposing the network
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simulation into ﬁrst contacts and then time of sexual contact allowed more control
over features of the network of sexual contacts over current dynamic network mod-
els (for a survey of network models, see Goldenberg et al., 2010). The dynamics of
sexual networks are not well understood and we acknowledge that the results for our
simulated population will be sensitive to the above choices.
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